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Abstract 
Since the late 1980s the Swedish educational system has been transformed 
through a number of market-based reforms. The purpose of the reforms was to 
increase efficiency and quality in Swedish schools by introducing private 
producers and reducing state regulation. Conversely, since the implementation of 
the reforms the between schools quality variation has increased which is argued to 
be associated with the characteristics of the different private organizations. The 
aim of this study is therefore to analyze organizational differences by examine 
stakeholder influence over the schools’ quality strategies. In an embedded case 
study the different schools are divided into four organizational categories based 
on the ownership structure and compared with a public and private strategy. By 
conducting interviews the organizations’ strategies were analyzed through the 
concepts of veto player, accountability, organizational goals and constraints which 
aim at identifying who can make decisions regarding the organizational 
understanding and pursuit of quality, who can influence these decisions and how 
quality is perceived. The results of the analysis suggest that stakeholders matter 
for the organizational quality pursuit both as veto players and as constraints 
through their ability to influence organizational decisions. 
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1 Introduction 
Since the late 1980s the Swedish welfare sector has been the subject of a radical 
transformation where the government through various market-based reforms has 
been contracting out public welfare services, such as health care, elderly care and 
education. Welfare services that were once exclusively provided by public 
organizations have been reduced and replaced with a variety of publicly funded 
private producers and today private organizations employ approximately one fifth 
of the welfare sector workforce (Hartman 2011, p. 7, 23, Nilsson 2013, p. 71). 
Correspondingly, decisions regarding organizations’ execution of service 
provision have been decentralized whilst the government controls organizational 
outputs through specific performance based benchmarks.  
These changes have instigated an intensive debate focusing on the existence of 
these publicly funded private organizations and whether today’s regulatory system 
sufficiently steers private organizations to pursue societal interests and ensure 
service quality over organizational self-interests, such as profit extraction (Dir. 
2015:22, Hess & Horn 2013, p. 1–7, Minow 2003, p. 1234, Nilsson 2013, p. 78–
79, 86–90, SOU 2015:7, Vlachos 2012, p. 16). Those arguing in favor for private 
provision claim that the replacement of public providers for private producers 
enhances economic efficiency and improves the quality of the services that are 
being produced as a result of market competition (Elinder & Jordahl 2013, p. 43, 
Hartman 2011, p. 13). Accordingly, competition between producers is claimed to 
promote consumer choice and stimulate innovation resulting in an increased 
service provision where the produced services are characterized by higher quality, 
are produced to a lower price and better respond to the needs of the consumers 
(Elacqua 2014, p. 10, Hartman 2011, p. 13–14). Conversely, critics argue that 
there is no evidence that market competition or the introduction of private 
providers actually promote either efficiency or quality. Rather, they emphasize on 
the complications of contracting out welfare services, especially the difficulty to 
monitor and measure service quality and the problem of self-interest driven for-
profit providers which are claimed to “have incentives to cut quality in the process 
of cutting costs and maximizing profits” (Elacqua 2014, p. 10), which 
consequently can jeopardize the public ambition of providing equal opportunities 
throughout the nation (Helby Petersen & Hjelmar 2014, p. 3–4, Minow 2003, p. 
1231–1234, SFS 2010:800). In recent years the debate has further intensified due 
to a number of media reports
1
 about maltreatment and other quality deficiencies in 
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 See for example the article series in Dagens Samhälle and in Dagens Nyheter (DN) about maltreatment in 
elderly care: http://www.dagenssamhalle.se/carema and http://www.dn.se/stories/stories-
sthlm/missforhallandena-inom-aldrevarden/. The reports about quality maltreatment in preschools can be read in 
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private welfare service organizations operating in sectors such as elderly care and 
education. This have steered the debate towards a questioning of the possibility 
for private companies to make profit in areas which are publicly funded and the 
prevalence of for-profit organizations on the market (Nilsson 2013, p. 72).  
Correspondingly to other welfare sectors the Swedish education system was 
transformed through a number of reforms during the late 1980s and the early 
1990s. The first reforms in the 1980s decentralized the responsibility of education 
from the state to the municipalities and introduced a more moderate regulatory 
system which regulated organizations through national objectives rather than 
controlling organizational processes. The following reform, Friskolereformen, 
was implemented in the beginning of the 1990s and was the result of an increased 
demand for a more efficient and individual based service production. The 
government, which traditionally had been the primary provider of education, was 
argued to be an inefficient producer. Contrariwise, the opinion was that the 
Swedish school system would rather benefit from a state of market competition 
which assumingly would increase efficiency and enhance service quality. Thus, in 
an attempt to pursue conditions for perfect competition the school market was 
opened and allowed market entries of all types of private
2
 organizations and 
ownership structures, making it easy for new actors to enter the market. To 
stimulate innovation and eliminate organizations with poor quality a choice 
reform was implemented which gave the students and parents the possibility to 
select which school to attend. Furthermore, quality standards was determined and 
formulated in the new Education Act and Curricula focusing on school 
performance given specific targets. Finally, to monitor and control service quality 
the new regulatory government agencies the Swedish National Agency for 
Education (NAE) and the Swedish Schools Inspectorate (SI) were founded 
(Holmlund et al 2014, p. 34–36, Prop. 1991/92:95, p. 10–11, Sahlgren 2011, p. 
29, SOU 2013:56, p. 63–65, Stiglitz 2000, p. 432).  
The anticipated results of the abovementioned reforms were increased service 
quality with better performing schools and enhanced student results. However, 
according to various international student assessment studies, such as PISA, 
PIRLS and TIMSS, student results did not increase but have in fact continued to 
decline. Accordingly, since the reforms were implemented Sweden’s average 
student performance ranking changed from above or around OECD average to 
below OECD average. When analyzing the decreasing student performance 
scholars have found that the between-school variation rather than the within-
school variation have increased, implying larger quality differences between 
schools than between students (Holmlund et al 2014, p. 60–70, OECD 2015, p. 
14, Sahlgren 2011, p. 31–32, Skolverket 1, Vlachos 2011, p. 66). In summary, 
since the national goals are the same for all organizations but results differ 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
Svenska Dagbladet (SvD) from March 19
th
 2014 http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/svep-svaltkost-pa-
forskolor_3379168.svd?sidan=1. 
2
 In Sweden most private schools are publicly funded and therefore called independent schools, including both 
private for-profit and non-profit organizations. 
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between schools there is reason to believe that the differences depend on the 
characteristics of these new organizations, which mandates for a study of the 
divergences of these organizations (Immergut 1992, p. 57). 
1.1 Organizations, quality and conflicting goals 
When private welfare service producers were first introduced on the Swedish 
welfare market for-profit organizations were the exception. However, in recent 
years these organizations have expanded rapidly while the non-profit alternatives 
have had an insignificant growth rate (Nilsson 2013, p. 86). As the expansion of 
the for-profit welfare organizations coincided with a parallel trend of declining 
quality various researchers have examined whether ownership structure in fact 
affect the outcome of welfare service production. 
For example, Ford and Kaserman (2000) studied ownership structure and 
medical service quality in the dialysis industry. They found that ownership 
structure for the for-profit organizations matters and that physician-owned for-
profit clinics outperformed corporate-owned for-profit clinics. Furthermore, that 
there was no quality difference between non-profit clinics and physician-owned 
for-profit clinics. Conversely, scholars Helby Petersen and Hjelmar (2014) studied 
the effects of the Scandinavian marketization experience by comparing the 
Swedish and Danish private provision of home care for the elderly, child care and 
the operation of nursing homes, concluded that there is “little generalizable 
evidence in support of improved cost effectiveness or enhanced service quality” 
(p. 14). 
Concerning education, Swedish scholars Sandström and Bergström (2005) 
conclude in their study that market competition and the increase of independent 
schools have in fact lead to higher results, therefore higher quality. Similarly, 
Sahlgren (2011) concludes that the prevalence of for-profit organizations on the 
school market increases student achievement and benefit students from low socio-
economic backgrounds. Furthermore, Hoxby (2000) states that competition that is 
restricted to only include public schools also improves quality. In other studies 
analyzing the differences between public and different kinds of private schools or 
education providers scholars such as Chubb and Moe (1988) and Tweedie, Riley, 
Chubb and Moe (1990) argue that private for-profit schools outperform public 
schools because of more efficient education production. Furthermore, that the 
school type that is expected to perform the best is the for-profit franchises because 
they can use their scale as an advantage for producing quality services more 
efficient and effectively than the public ones (Chubb 2001). In opposition, 
Lubienski and Lubienski (2006, 2013) argue that public schools perform better 
than private and that the performance advantage in private schools can be 
explained by student demographics.  
Moreover, Chilean researcher Elacqua claims that a common argument is that 
“for-profit schools cannot be trusted to place the interests of children ahead of 
profitability” (OIE 2007 in Elacqua 2014, p. 3) therefore their quality aspirations 
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can be questioned. However, Minow (2003) argues that a lot of the critique of the 
private organizations instead is based on the presumption that they are rather 
jeopardizing societal interests. Since quality relies on informed choosers and 
because the school market is distinguished by information asymmetry 
organizations are given incentives to pursue quality indicators which are easy to 
measure and which do not always correspond to societal interests (Chubb & Moe 
1988, Minow 2003, Ladd 2002). 
Additionally, Hartman states there seems to be a lack of credible empirical 
studies of the effects of private for-profit organizations on quality (or many 
conflicting studies), but also that there is no good measurements for quality 
(Hartman 2011, p. 262). Hence, it appears that debate is rather about how public 
and private organizations understand quality, how their understandings differ and 
what constitute the reasons for the differences. 
1.1.1 Relevance 
As mentioned in previous sections, the reforms that have been implemented 
during the last 30 years have shifted the landscape of the Swedish welfare service 
provision. Public schools now operate alongside different types of private 
organizations, including schools with either a non-profit or for-profit motive, 
while regulation has changed from regulation within organizations to regulation of 
organizations (Berg et al 1999, p. 54, Vlachos 2012). Researchers have also found 
that quality differences between schools have increased, however that there are 
contradictory results regarding the effects of these new organizations on quality. 
There seems to be an aggregated quality decline according to international studies 
but if this is a result of the organizational context is uncertain (Holmlund et al 
2014, p. 60–70, OECD 2015, p. 14). 
While scholars have attempted to measure the effects of the introduction of the 
different organizations on the market, others suggest that it is necessary to analyze 
the organizations themselves by examining who can influence the organizations, 
who make the decision within the organizations and how this impact the 
organization’s goals and in this case the quality in the educational output (for 
example Ansoff & McDonnell 1987, Bryson 1988 in Friedman & Miles 2006, p. 
292). Thus, the dilemma seems to be that we do not know what happens within 
the organizations or who makes the decisions regarding quality within each 
organization and what differs between these organizations. Furthermore, since 
there is no mutual understanding of what quality is, the differences may depend 
on different understanding of the definition of the concept and what it includes 
(Hartman 2011, p. 262, SOU 2013:56, p. 212, Vlachos 2011, p. 66). 
I propose that one of these differences is the organization of the schools where 
different actors or stakeholders are involved in decision-making processes within 
these organizations. Therefore, instead of trying to measure quality and the effect 
of welfare service privatizations I aim to examine who can influence the internal 
organizational process and if this is interlinked with how the different 
organizations understand and pursue the concept of quality. 
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Furthermore, I aim to expand the concept of independent schools and while 
previous studies have classified independent schools into two categories after their 
ambition to make profit I introduce a third option derived from the Chilean 
researcher Elacqua (2014, p. 3) and Elacqua et al (2011a, 2011b). Therefore, I aim 
to divide and compare organizations into four categories; public, non-profit, 
autonomous for-profit and for-profit franchises. 
1.2 Statement of purpose and research question 
The purpose of this study is to understand how outcomes differ between school 
types by investigating who has the decision-making power in the organizations, 
who can influence decisions and how this affects the organizations’ understanding 
and pursuit of quality. Thus, the research question that will guide this study is:  
 
- How do stakeholders influence how the organizations on the Swedish school 
market understand and pursue quality in educational provision? 
 
By conducting qualitative interviews I aim to answer the research question. In 
order to answer this question the purpose is to study and analyze stakeholders in 
the organizations in order to identify who has the veto power, or the decision-
making power, and influence over decisions regarding quality. I argue that 
depending on who the veto player is and who has the possibility to make certain 
decisions will determine how the organization will prioritize and pursue quality. 
Further, as discussed in chapter three, I examine whether different school types 
pursue quality similarly within four different organizational types based on 
Elacqua’s school categories (see Elacqua et al 2011a, Elacqua 2014). 
1.3 Delimitations and presumptions 
In order for the scholar to clarify his understanding of the initial research problem 
and to prevent that the content of the study does not address the purpose of the 
study Yin proposes that a number of delimitations should be done. These 
delimitations also help the scholar to stay within reasonable limits and within the 
scope of the study. Moreover, he argues that delimitations should address the unit 
of analysis and how the scholar understands it so that a clear definition can be 
established (Yin 2003, p. 21–24).  
In this study the unit of analysis is the organizations and the actors related to 
them that can be found on the Swedish school market. By organizations I am 
referring to the schools, both public and independent. Furthermore, as the 
independent schools are privately owned schools, whether they are owned by a 
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non-profit organization or a limited company, I will refer to them as either 
independent schools or private organizations throughout the study
3
.  
The emphasis of this study is to understand of how stakeholders and thus 
organizations understand and pursue quality. Therefore, to answer how 
organizations are understood the definition from Jacobsen and Thorsvik (2008) is 
used which states that an organization is “a social system deliberately constructed 
to achieve determined goals” [my translation] (Etzioni 1982 in Jacobsen & 
Thorsvik 2008, p. 13) and can be understood as a production system. Accordingly, 
an organization can be described as a process consisting of three essential steps; 
resources (input), transaction and performance (output). This means that an 
organization is a process of producing a commodity or a service, referred to as the 
output. To be able to produce the output the organization relies on resource input 
in terms of for example labor, material or information. The actual creation of the 
commodity or service produced is called the transaction which Jacobsen and 
Thorsvik refer to as the process whereas the actors (or stakeholders) within the 
organization transform the input to output (ibid p. 14–15). Furthermore, they 
argue that the transaction or transformation within the organization is conditioned 
by the organizational context as well as the external environment (or the policy 
context) that the organization is embedded in. While the organizational context 
includes the organization’s goals and strategies or the attitudes and actions of the 
stakeholders within, the policy context affects the organizational context for 
example the organization’s strategies for reaching the goals. Thus, as the output or 
performance of the organization is the product of the transaction, this 
transformation will therefore determine the performance of the organization and 
reflect the organizational context and priorities (Jacobsen & Thorsvik 2008, p. 
16–22). With this said, organizations are understood as producers of quality which 
will be based on the organizations goals which are decided by influential 
stakeholders. 
Since there seems to be a mutual disagreement whether independent schools 
or private organizations have positive, negative or any effects on quality (Hartman 
2011, p. 262–263) this study derives from the presumption that all schools pursues 
quality, thus that one of the organizational objectives is quality education, but 
dependent on who has the veto power to define the understanding of the concept 
the priorities and strategies for reaching the target will differ from different 
organizations. 
Finally, to limit the scope I am focusing on compulsory comprehensive 
schools. 
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 Independent schools are not to be confused with private schools, which are schools that are allowed to charge a 
tuition fee and are therefore not facing the same conditions as the voucher contingent independent schools. 
Therefore, the private schools are excluded from this study, including for example international schools and 
national boarding schools (SOU 2013:56, p. 75). 
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1.3.1 Thesis outline 
In the following, I begin by giving a background of the Swedish education system 
by presenting a brief historical view of the reforms that changed the educational 
system. Further, the chapter also gives an overview of what characterizes the 
actors that exists on the market. In the third chapter I outline the theoretical 
understanding by defining and discussing concepts and definitions that are used 
throughout the thesis. I conclude this chapter by presenting an analytical 
framework. In chapter four the methodological considerations and the 
operationalization of theory will be presented and discussed. The empirical 
findings made from interviews will be presented and discussed in chapter five. 
Finally, in chapter six, the concluding remarks are presented along with 
suggestions for future research.  
  8 
2 General characteristics of the 
Swedish Educational System 
Whilst the introductory chapter briefly introduced the Swedish educational 
system, this following chapter provides a more in-depth background to the 
Swedish system. First, the reforms that transformed the system are presented and 
important characteristics of the reformed system are emphasized. Second, the 
different types of organizations that exist on the market after the reforms are 
introduced. When discussing different types of organizations I am referring to the 
different types of schools that exist. 
2.1 Education reforms 
The point of departure of this section is the reforms that were implemented in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, which gradually have transformed the Swedish 
educational system to its current state and which are relevant for how current 
organizations make decisions regarding the pursuit for quality education. First, the 
responsibility for the supply of education has been decentralized from the state to 
the municipalities. Second, the supply and demand of education meets on a 
competition driven school market accessible for all types of organizations. Third, 
the school market is distinguished by a state of consumer control due to a school 
choice reform. Fourth, schools are financed through school vouchers which are 
universal, are targeting the education provider and the size of the voucher depends 
on the number of students enrolled in the school. Fifth, performance based 
management guides the transaction process, the work within the schools, as well 
as the regulatory mechanisms (Gingrich 2011, p. 152– 153, Holmlund et al 2014, 
p. 1, 19–21). In following sections I will discuss following characteristics by 
focusing on responsibilities for the organization of education and regulation. 
2.1.1 Organization of education 
Education is a public good and it is often argued that education generates positive 
effects for both the society and the individual. For the individual education can for 
example significantly increase the income and for the society education can be 
used for distributional measures and to increase productivity. Therefore, 
guaranteeing equal opportunities throughout the nation is of high priority and 
constitutes the purpose of Swedish education according to the fourth paragraph of 
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the first chapter in the Swedish Education Act (Holmlund et al 2014, p. 16–20, 
SFS 2010:800, SOU 2013:56, p. 63, Stiglitz 2000, p. 426–429, 439). In a report 
from IFAU Holmlund et al (2014) claim that an argument for decentralizing the 
Swedish educational system was that local decision-makers had better 
understanding of the local conditions and therefore better could meet the local 
demand and provide more accurate measures that ensured equal opportunities or 
equal quality in the schools (p. 19, 24–25). Furthermore, it was argued that the 
central control hampered local autonomy and local initiatives (Skolverket 2009 in 
Holmlund et al 2014, p. 34).  
Therefore, through three government propositions; styrpropositionen from 
1988, kommunaliseringspropositionen from 1989 and ansvarspropositionen from 
1990 the school system was decentralized. The first proposition, 
styrpropositionen, suggested that municipalities should have increased influence 
over the schools and that the general responsibility for the schools should be 
shifted from the central to the local level. The overall responsibility for Swedish 
education remained state controlled while the municipalities were proposed to 
have the responsibility for the organization of schools and the execution of 
education. Additionally, municipalities were allowed to develop school plans and 
make decisions regarding employment of school leaders, such as principals. The 
second proposition, kommunaliseringspropositionen, shifted all labour and 
employment responsibilities for the school sector workforce from the state to the 
municipalities. The third proposition, ansvarspropositionen, further established the 
division of responsibilities between the government and the municipalities by 
introducing performance management in Swedish schools and defining the 
concept of education provider. First, to ensure that Swedish education was equal 
and of good quality it was proposed that schools would benefit from regulation 
through performance management rather than through though government 
control. This type of regulation implies that the government provides the targets 
or the expectations for the schools in terms of national goals which are formulated 
in a national Curricula and Education Act instead of setting up detailed rules and 
procedures that guide the education process. But performance based management 
is also based on the idea of delegating decision-making to the municipalities, 
education providers and the principals which have the responsibility to convert 
national goals into strategies and operationalized goals that guides their work. The 
state on the other hand has the responsibility to monitor, follow up and evaluate 
these targets, which is delegated to government agencies. Second, an education 
provider is defined as an actor that is authorized to provide education and is 
responsible for goal attainment in all of his organizations, but also to provide 
resources for the principal to be able to achieve the decided targets within the 
school. With this said, the municipalities are responsible both as the actor that had 
the overall responsibility that schools in their area provide adequate education and 
reach the national targets, but also as education providers that supplies public 
education (Holmlund et al 2014, p. 35–36, Prop. 1988/89:4, Prop. 1989/90:41, 
Prop. 1990/91:18, SOU 2013:56, p. 63–69, 94, 125–129). 
In 1992 the independent school reform, Friskolereformen, was implemented 
with the aim to permit private organizations on the market. The school market was 
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opened for all types of private organizations but with the restriction that the 
government determined which organizations that were approved as education 
providers. The private organizations that were approved were subjected to the 
same conditions as the public organizations and the municipalities were obligated 
to reimburse independent school equivalent to public schools. The anticipated 
result of this reform was a more individualized and demand driven supply of 
education with an increased number of schools with alternative pedagogical 
approaches, augmented efficiency were the independent schools could replace 
inefficient publicly run schools and improved service quality throughout the entire 
school system due to market competition and parental choice. 
In addition to the independent school reform a choice reform, 
skolvalsreformen, was implemented which further strengthened students’ and 
parents’ possibilities to select which school to attend. The possibility to select 
school was supposed to lead to higher motivation among students, spur 
competition among schools which assumingly would result in more niched 
schools and higher quality where schools with low quality would get knocked out 
from the market (Prop. 1991/92:95, Prop. 1992/93:230, Sahlgren 2011, p. 29, 
SOU 2013:56, p. 130–132). Furthermore, as a result of the independent school 
reform the municipalities where given the responsibility to finance the schools 
through school vouchers. Since then, school vouchers are universal and public and 
independent schools are equally remunerated through a basic subsidy. The size of 
the basic voucher
4
 is based on the number of enrolled students in the school and is 
calculated to cover expenses of an average-performing student. Schools are not 
permitted to charge any additional fees. The school voucher is paid to the 
education provider who makes the decisions how the voucher should be allocated 
between and/or within the schools (SFS 2010:800, SOU 2013:56, p. 58–59, 80). 
2.1.2 Regulation 
As mentioned in earlier sections, one distinctive feature of the decentralization of 
the Swedish schools system was that performance management was introduced in 
Swedish schools. Thus, performance management replaced the former governing 
mode of regulation by rules which was considered too bureaucratic and an 
obstacle for local initiatives. The previous regulation model was characterized by 
a centralized mode of control and the service production and schools were 
governed through a top-down model focusing on regulating processes within the 
school through detailed-oriented instructions which regulated particulars such as 
the amount of time that should be spent on each subject, how teaching should be 
structured and what should be included. Moreover, schools were financed through 
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 An additional subsidy can be paid to provide mother tongue tuition and for students in need of special support. 
Moreover, both private and public education providers can also apply for government grants which are targeting 
a specific issue determined by the government, for example to increase goal attainment in mathematics (SFS 
2010:800, SOU 2013:56, p. 58–59, 80) 
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targeted government grants aimed at funding specific parts of the schools 
operations. Berg et al argues that the main difference of these two regulatory 
systems is that regulation by rules is regulations within the school focusing on 
how things are done while performance management is regulation of the school 
which instead focuses of what things are done. Furthermore, while regulation by 
rules steers processes within the schools performance management measures 
organizational outputs and compares them to determined benchmarks or minimum 
quality levels. The national targets determine what organizations should strive for, 
but how operations are done is left to decision-makers in the municipalities and 
within the schools (Berg et al 1999, p. 54–59, Holmlund et al 2014, p. 34, 36–39, 
Pierre 2007, p. 9–10, 15). 
For this model to be effective Stiglitz among others argues that “clear 
performance measures for schools must be established” (Nilsson 2013, p. 79, 
Stiglitz 2000, p. 438) to ensure that “those engaged in the educational process 
behave as they are supposed to behave” (Chubb & Moe 1988, p. 1069). Since the 
state (or municipals) is the payer of the produced services, Gingrich argues that, 
they “would like to achieve value for their [my italics] money” (Gingrich 2011, p. 
11) where a situation of competition gives the producers incentives to produce at 
the lowest cost and where the state controls and sets minimum quality standards 
(ibid., p. 11). Furthermore, Dixit argues that in the performance based 
management model control is to measure quality, therefore quality must be 
operationalized into observable, measurable variables that easily can be monitored 
and controlled (Dixit 2002, p. 697, 720-721). 
Therefore, with the implementation of performance management in the 
Swedish schools system the government was given the general responsibility for 
regulating education and the responsibility to control, monitor, follow-up and 
evaluate the education system. The mission to regulate the education system was 
accomplished through three different modes of control; legal, ideological and 
financial. First, in the Education Act legally binding organizational benchmarks 
were established. Second, in the national Curricula the general targets were 
explained and clarified and recommendations of how to reach the objectives were 
formulated. Third, through government grants the government targeted some 
areas of interest and through financial control of the agencies within this area the 
government regulated their missions (Jarl et al 2007, p.25–29, Pierre 2007, p. 15). 
The latter responsibility, to control, monitor, follow-up and evaluate the education 
system, was delegated to the government agencies the National Agency for 
Education (NAE) and the Swedish Schools Inspectorate (SI). The NAE was given 
the ideological mode of control with the responsibility to develop clear goals and 
knowledge requirements in national Curricula and syllabuses and to evaluate the 
education system. The SI was given the legal mode of control though an auditing 
role and the responsibility for issuing licenses to approved education providers. 
Their auditing role includes supervisions and quality assessments of schools based 
on legislation and the established benchmarks (Skolinspektionen 1, Skolverket 2, 
SOU 2013:56, p. 159–166). 
The state has limited financial control over the schools due the 
decentralization of financial control to the municipalities. However, the 
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municipalities have the responsibility to follow-up and evaluate the schools within 
their area. Furthermore, the education provider has the responsibility to follow-up, 
evaluate and reach the national goal within his organizations and finally the 
principals have similar responsibility for the operations within their school 
(Holmlund et al 46–47, Jarl et al 2007, p. 27). 
2.2 Organizations and actors on the school market 
Prior to the independent school reform, Friskolereformen, in 1992 the government 
or the municipalities were essentially the only education providers, meaning that 
basically all Swedish students attended a public school
5
 (Böhlmark & Lindahl 
2013, p. 7, Prop. 1991/92:95, p. 10-11, Sahlgren 2011, p. 29). However, after the 
implementation of the independent school reform there was a major expansion of 
new types of schools that entered the market and today almost every sixth student 
attend an independent school. Furthermore, the number of students attending 
independent compulsory schools have increased from 1,5 percent in 1993 to 13,6 
percent in 2013 while the number of independent compulsory schools on the 
market has increased to 792 in 2013, constituting 16 percent of the school market 
(Jämförelsetal, Skolverket 1, SOU 2013:56, p. 77, 121). Additionally, within the 
independent school category there is a development of a greater variety of 
different school and organizational types. Thus, the independent school category 
can be described as a group that is characterized by great heterogeneity (SOU 
2013:56, p. 71, 74–75, 95). 
To be able to understand the variety between different actors and 
organizations some essential definitions need to be established. First, the actor 
responsible for the schools internal work is the principal (Augustinsson & Brynolf 
2012, p. 215–216). Second, an education provider is the actor responsible for the 
organization of education in both public and independent schools. In most 
compulsory comprehensive public schools the education provider is the 
municipality and in independent schools the education is organized by a private 
education provider which is either a natural person or a legal person. A natural 
person can be one or more individuals and with a legal person I am referring to 
companies, associations, organizations or trusts. In SOU (2013:56) eight different 
legal structures are identified; Trusts, limited companies (or joint-stock-
companies), non-profit organizations, economic associations, trading companies, 
limited partnerships, religious communities and individuals (see table 2.1 below) 
(p. 95-96). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
5
 Some private schools existed prior to the independent school reform. However, the student attendance in these 
schools corresponded to less than one percent of all Swedish students (Böhlmark & Lindahl 2013, p. 7). 
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Table 2.1 Schools divided by education provider 
School type Education provider 
Public Municipal 
Independent  
 Limited company/ Joint-stock 
company 
 Trust/Foundation 
 Non-profit organization (secular) 
 Economic association 
 Trading partnership 
 Limited partnership 
 Religious (non-profit) organization 
 Sole trader 
Source: SOU 2013:56, p. 95–96 
 
In following sections I discuss the organizational structure and actors in these 
two schools types. 
2.2.1 Independent schools 
The definition of an independent school is that it is operated by a private 
education provider which can either be owned by a legal person or a natural 
person (SOU 2013:56, p. 95). 
If the education provider is a 
company it can have one or 
more owners, which could 
either be legal or natural 
persons. This ownership and 
management structure is 
illustrated in figure 2.1. As 
can be seen in the figure an 
education provider can 
manage one or more schools 
and the ownership can vary in 
different education providers 
where an education provider 
can be owed by both natural and legal persons. However, according to SOU 
(2013:56) the committee concludes that if more than 50 percent of the education 
provider is owned by a company then the education provider is part of a branch. A 
branch is constituted of two or more companies and consists of a parent company 
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and one or more companies that are subsidiaries to the parent company (ibid. p. 
51, 94–95). 
In a governmental report about independent schools in Sweden the committee 
proposes a classification of the different school types based on two main 
characteristics: educational approach and ownership structure. First, schools are 
classified into five different types after their educational approach. The different 
educational approaches are: general, denominational, Waldorf, international and 
national boarding schools. Second, schools are classified into eight different 
groups based on ownership structure of the education provider (see table 2.1 in 
section 2.2). In 2012 the most common ownership structure was limited 
companies which accounted for approximately 44 percent of the private education 
providers, while the second most frequently occurring ownership type was 
economic associations which accounted for 21 percent of the education providers. 
The third and fourth largest ownership groups which represented 17 and 15 
percent of the education providers were non-profit organizations and trusts (SOU 
2013:56, p. 78, 95-96). 
Subsequently, based on organizational features the different ownership 
structures are often categorized into two groups; non-profit and for-profit 
organizations. The first group, the non-profit organizations, includes special 
pedagogy schools, religious schools, parent cooperatives or schools run by 
economic associations or foundations, while the second group, the for-profit 
organizations, consists of joint-stock, private or trading companies.  
One of the reasons for launching the independent school reform was the belief 
that schools with alternative pedagogical educational approaches would increase. 
However, in 2012 87 percent of the independent schools had a general educational 
approach. Furthermore, the majority of the new schools that were started during 
the first years after the reform were non-profit schools. However, this has changed 
over time and since the late 1990’s the for-profit schools have increased rapidly 
and today the for-profit schools counts for around 65 percent of the independent 
schools. Accordingly, in 2013 almost two out of three students that were enrolled 
in an independent school attended a for-profit school and 43 percent of the private 
education providers were part of a branch (Böhlmark & Lindahl 2013, p. 8, 
Sahlgren 2011, p. 28, Skolverket 2014, p. 7, SOU 2013:56, p. 78, 96, 98). 
2.2.2 Public schools 
The definition of a public school is a school that has the municipality as the 
education provider. 
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While the number of independent schools has expanded rapidly in recent years, 
the larger majority of Swedish students are still enrolled in a public school and in 
2012 87 percent of Swedish students attended a public school (SOU 2013:56, p. 
77). These are, after the decentralization reforms, operated by the municipalities. 
As illustrated in figure 2.2, the municipal assembly and a committee functions as 
the education provider. The municipal assembly is the decision-making body but 
delegates to the committee. The committee controls the administration which 
implements policies (Ds. 2004:31).  
  16 
3 Theoretical framework 
In following chapter the aim is to build a theoretical framework of my 
understanding of organizations and stakeholder influence based on a discussion of 
the theoretical choices that have been made and definitions of theoretical 
concepts. The chapter begins with a discussion about the theoretical points of 
departure for this study. Thereafter follows a section in which I attempt to clarify 
how to understand the concept of organizations and how stakeholders can 
influence organizations and organizational goals. Next section provides a 
comparison of public and private organizations and how they differ in terms of 
organizational structure and stakeholder influence. The following section 
introduces hybrid organizations. To conclude this chapter an analytical model is 
presented which will guide the analysis. 
3.1 Theoretical points of departure 
As mentioned in the introductory chapters, the reforms made within the field of 
education have changed the landscape of educational supply. First, a variety of 
new types of organizations have entered the arena. Second, decisions about 
organizational transaction processes have been decentralized to actors and 
stakeholders closer to the service producing organizations. Third, organizations 
are regulated by controlling and measuring the organizational goal attainment.  
One point of departure in this study is therefore based on one of the basic 
ideas of performance management, which is that decisions regarding operational 
targets are delegated to actors closer to or that are involved in the service 
production. But also that actors’ decisions regarding the organizational goals will 
have an impact on the organizational output (Friedman & Miles 2006, p. 5, Jones 
1995, p. 407). Thus, by goal, target or objective I am referring to what is 
prioritized or considered important and what sets the aspiration level and guides 
the activities within the organization (Cyert & March 1963, p. 115), or as a 
“description of a desired future condition” as Etzioni defines them (Etzioni 1982 
in Jacobsen & Thorsvik 2008, p. 33).  
Moreover, decisions that affect the organizational targets and outcomes are 
being made every day within an organization (Jacobsen & Thorsvik 2008, p. 327–
329). Hence, another point of departure is to identify which actor or stakeholder 
that can make or influence those decisions. The emphasis is therefore on who can 
make certain decisions, who can influence the decision-maker and not how 
decisions are made. 
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A third point of departure is that one type of decisions that can be made within 
an organization concerns the organizational quality pursuit. As mentioned in 
section 1.3 the presumption is that all organizations or schools on the Swedish 
school market pursue educational quality, hence one of their organizational 
objectives is quality. However, their strategy or how they pursue quality is 
different which impacts their quality choices. Thus, initially it is appropriate to 
discuss what quality is and how quality can be judged and measured. The concept 
of quality is often claimed to be distinguished of complexity, multidimensionality 
and subjectivity, and to establish an objective universal definition seems to be 
associated with numerous difficulties (Hartman 2011, p. 265, SOU 2013:56, p. 
212). Although in economic theories quality is often argued to be related to 
individuals’ or collective’s expectations and experienced satisfaction of a certain 
products or services or as Skärvad and Olsson define the concept; the product or 
service “ability to reach certain predetermined goals” [my translation] (Ansoff & 
McDonnell 1987, p. 48, Skärvad & Olsson 2008, p. 202–203). Furthermore, 
evaluating quality of services is more difficult as customers may participate in the 
service production, for example in the provision of education where education 
quality includes to motivate and stimulate the customers or the students to be able 
to achieve good results and attain knowledge but where the production of 
education is conditional to the students’ initial motivation (SOU 2013:56, p. 212). 
Therefore, measuring quality can be achieved through selecting and evaluating 
indicators and goals for each step in an organizations production process. 
Subsequently, in a governmental report four different modes of quality 
measurements are mentioned: result quality, structure quality, process quality and 
brand [my translation] (SOU 2013:56, p. 214, 239). These divergent 
measurements aim to control different stages of the organizational production 
process, where result quality measures the performance of the organizations 
(output), structure quality measure the preconditions or resource allocation 
(input), process quality refers to how the activities are executed (transaction 
process) and brand aims at organizational profiles and marketing. 
Proceeding from quality to the question why stakeholders matter a definition 
of stakeholders is essential to establish. Freeman defines stakeholder as “those 
groups who are vital to the survival and success of the organization” (Freeman 
2004 in Friedman & Miles 2006, p. 4). To what extent these individuals and 
stakeholder groups can affect or influence the organization varies as do their, 
often conflicting, interests (Dixit 2002, p. 697, Freeman 2010, p. 8–25). 
3.2 Understanding stakeholder influence in 
organizations 
In this section I intend to present and discuss the essential concepts and theories 
that I use to understand organizations and how stakeholders can influence 
organizations. I will proceed by focusing on understanding the organization 
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through three dimensions; as a production system, as a social system embedded in 
an external environment and as a strategic entity. 
3.2.1 The organizational context 
The tradition of organizational theory stands on an interdisciplinary foundation 
where scholars from different research fields have contributed to current 
understanding of organizations, their surroundings and the activities within them. 
Departing from the classical view of organizations, this view derives from the 
German biologist von Bertalanffy founder of the general systems theory. The 
general systems theory contributed to the interpretation of organizations as open 
systems or mechanisms that transforms an input, or resources, to an output, in 
terms of products and services. Furthermore, that all systems consist of 
interdependent parts or subsystems ‘embedded’ in a larger system. In modern 
organizational theory this understanding has translated into three organizational 
system levels; the general system level referring to the environment surrounding 
the organization, the system level meaning the organization itself and the 
subsystem level focusing on divisions within the organization (Barnard 1938 in 
Freeman 2010, p. 37, Hatch 2002, p. 54–60, 74–76, 111).  
In the general system organizations are seen as autonomous actors that interact 
with other actors, constituting the interorganizational network. Within the 
interorganizational network various transactions occur between the participants, 
including both other organizations and actors such as suppliers, customers, unions 
and agencies, affecting all interacting participants (Hatch 2002, p. 87–89, 
Laumann et al 1978, p. 457). Laumann et al (1978) states that the application of 
“an open-systems perspective to the theory of organizations quickly led to 
recognition of the critical significance that an organization’s environment plays in 
its activities” (p. 457). Furthermore, Jacobsen & Thorsvik (2008) adds that the 
organization is placed in a system where the organization’s interaction with the 
surroundings affects the organizational outcomes (p. 13–15).  
However, various critics, such as Child, conversely argue that “environmental 
conditions cannot be regarded as a direct source of variation in organizational 
structure, as open systems theorists often imply. The critical link lies in the 
decision-makers’ evaluation of the organization’s position in the environmental 
areas they regard as important, and in the action they may consequently take about 
its internal structure” (Child 1972 in Heracleous 2003, p. 30).  
This leads us to the understanding that the environment plays a vital role in the 
organization’s activities as Laumann et al stated as well as the ‘internal 
functioning’ of organizations labeled organizational action for the organizational 
outcome (Heracleous 2003, p. xiii, 23). However, the environment can only affect 
the already existing process or organizational paradigm. This exposes a 
discrepancy between modern organizational theories, where organizations are 
seen as actors with inherent goals, and corporate management theories, which 
claim that a corporation (or an organization) is a coalition or grouping of 
individuals in relation to certain organizational objectives (ex. Cyert & Marrch 
  19 
1963, p. 27, Freeman 2010, p. 31–49, Jacobsen & Thorsvik 2008, p. 177, 
Laumann et al 1978, p. 457). Nevertheless, this leads to that organizations are not 
entities but “a social system deliberately constructed to achieve determined goals” 
[my translation] (Etzioni 1982 in Jacobsen & Thorsvik 2008, p. 13) with the aim 
to achieve or produce certain targets or services but also that they consist of 
stakeholders determining how the production and the delivery of the services will 
be done (Jacobsen and Thorsvik 2008, p. 16). Drawing on scholars Cyert and 
March they argue that rather than regarding an organization as single actor with 
its own goals and conflict free rationality it should be regarded as a composition 
of different stakeholders and coalitions (Cyert & March 1963 in Jacobsen & 
Thorsvik 2008, p. 177). 
 
Figure 3.1 illustrates a summary of my understanding of an organization. First, 
the organization can be viewed as a production system transforming an input to an 
output and where the environment, for example state regulation or legislation, has 
some impact on the transaction process. Second, the transaction process however 
depends on the organizational paradigm and influential decision-makers. Starting 
in the internal context within the organization, which is called organizational 
paradigm, this includes both formal and informal features. The formal features 
consist of organizational structure and the formal organizational goals and the 
informal features are organizational culture and informal power relations. The 
organizational structure refers to the division of labour within the organization 
and how labour is coordinated, whilst the organizational goals establish guidelines 
for the organization’s activities. The organizational culture comprises shared 
values and opinions while the power relations can be observed in outcomes of 
conflicts where interests of different stakeholders and coalitions have met. 
Moreover, the strategic choice by the veto player is the priorities that are decided 
within the organization by the actor that has the power to decide and affects the 
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goal attainment within the organization. The decision-maker will have to conform 
to the policy context or environment when making the choice. Finally, the 
realized strategy is the realization of the decision-makers choices and what guides 
the organization’s transaction process and goal attainment or as Heracleous argues 
“organizational action” (Heracleous 2003, p. xiv, 27–32, Jacobsen & Thorsvik 
2008, p. 17–18, 140). 
3.2.2 Who are the stakeholders?  
Freeman defines stakeholders as “any group or individual who is affected by or 
can affect the achievement of an organization’s objectives” (Freeman 2010, p. 
25). Moreover, Jones defines the concept as “groups and individuals … with (a) 
the power to affect the firm’s performance and/or (b) a stake in the firm’s 
performance” (Jones 1995, p. 407). In figure 3.2 from Freeman’s book Strategic 
Management: A 
Stakeholder Approach he 
specifies the relevant 
stakeholders as following. 
The model includes both 
internal stakeholders 
involved in the transaction 
process, such as managers 
and employees, and 
external stakeholders 
outside of the organization, 
such as customers, the 
government and 
government agencies, 
suppliers and other actors 
and organizations (see 
figure 3.2) (Freeman 2010, 
p. 8–23, 25, 216–218, Friedman & Miles 2006, p. 8–9). 
One central idea in stakeholder theory is the aim to distinguish between 
different types of stakeholders and to identify those that can influence decisions in 
the organization or as Freeman stated those that ‘can affect’ rather than ‘be 
affected by’. Furthermore, Donaldson and Preston distinguish between influencers 
and stakeholders which are actors that can or cannot influence and have and have 
not a stake (1995, p. 86). For example in figure 3.2 media is one type of 
stakeholder that have no stake but can influence, while owners and employees 
both have a stake and can influence. Drawing on Rowley, he argues that how and 
which stakeholders that can influence, and therefore belongs to Jones a-type, can 
be described by starting at the organization and adding stakeholders as a network 
surrounding the organizations. By considering stakeholders as part of a network, 
much like the interorganizational network which surrounded the organizations, 
stakeholder influence Rowley continues, is dependent on two key factors; 
  21 
centrality and density, where centrality is the stakeholder’s position towards other 
stakeholders in the network and density is the interconnectedness between the 
different stakeholders. A higher level of centrality means a higher level of 
stakeholder power or influence (Friedman & Miles 2006, p. 11-14, 97–98, 110–
111, Rowley 1997, p. 888, 896–898). Stakeholders with more influence than 
others can be labeled powerful or critical stakeholders and can for example consist 
of employees or suppliers (see figure 3.2). In addition, Bowie argues that critical 
stakeholders are those that “without whose support the organization would cease 
to exist” (Bowie 1988 in Friedman & Miles 2006, p. 5). 
Up to now, the discussion has focused on the stakeholders that can and cannot 
influence decisions regarding organizational goals without addressing the question 
of which stakeholder that can make a decision. We have seen that with a higher 
degree of centrality stakeholder influence change from “be affected” to “can 
affect” organizational goals transforming those actors into powerful or critical 
stakeholders. As a further expansion of the stakeholder concept and an extension 
of critical stakeholders I include the concept of veto player. Consequently, veto 
players are critical stakeholders that have the power to make decisions compared 
to other stakeholders which have no or some degree of influence over the 
decision-making process. According to Tsebelis “a veto player is an individual or 
collective actor whose agreement is required for policy decisions” (Tsebelis 1995 
cited in König et al 2010, p. 22). For example in figure 3.1 the veto player is the 
decision-maker that can make a strategic choice which affects the organization’s 
goals and that will guide the organization’s strategies. The concept of veto player 
derives from Tsebelis veto player theory which focuses on political institutions 
and decision-making within these institutions. Tsebelis’ aim is to attempt to 
understand the differences in policy outcomes in political systems by focusing on 
actors within these organizations. Furthermore, the veto player theory determines 
which actor that has the ability to stop a policy or a choice to be made (Tsebelis 
2002). Immergut calls these points in a decision-making process veto points 
(Immergut 1990, p. 396). 
Moreover, veto players are often managers and it is disputed whether 
managers should be considered stakeholders, however in this study I will regard 
managers as stakeholder, in fact they belong to the internal stakeholders. It can be 
argued that whether managers are veto players or not is conditioned to the 
decision-making structure that exists within the organization (Hatch 2002, p. 300). 
3.2.3 Decision-making and strategy in organizations 
Decisions are being made constantly inside organizations regarding different 
issues and areas within the organization, where some of these decisions affect the 
performance of the organization and other do not (Hatch 2002, p. 300, Jacobsen & 
Thorsvik 2008, p. 327–330). The definition of a decision is that it describes an 
active situation where a choice between different alternatives are being made and 
where the selected alternative involves a commitment for action (Langley et al 
1995 in Jacobsen & Thorsvik 2008, p. 329). The variety of decisions that can be 
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made are often divided into three categories; operational day-to-day decisions 
regarding the execution of the organization’s goals, tactical or administrative 
decisions which includes those decisions about the implementation of the 
organization’s goals or structuring the organization’s resources to fulfill the 
objectives, and finally strategic choices which determines the goals of the 
organization (Ansoff & McDonnell 1987, p. 23–24, 27, Friedman & Miles 2006, 
p. 11, Oxelheim & Wihlborg 2008, p. 12, 184–185). Who can make these 
different types of decisions often depends on the organizational structure which 
determines the decision-making structure inside the organization (Cyert & March 
1963, p. 83). In the more traditional organizations strategic decisions are made on 
the top level by the equivalent to a firm’s CEO or while tactical are often made by 
middle level managers and the operational decisions by actors on the lower levels 
(Hatch 2002, p. 300, Oxelheim & Wihlborg 2008, p. 11–13, 185). This gives an 
indication of who the veto player is. 
The nature of a decision is, according to Langley, that decisions involves a 
commitment for actions and can therefore be comprehended as contracts which 
implies that veto player or decision-makers can be interpreted as ‘contract 
holders’ (Freeman & Evans 1990 in Friedman & Miles 2006, p. 6). Furthermore, 
drawing on Eisenhardt (1989) Jones claims that “the contract is an appropriate 
metaphor for the relationships between the firm and its stakeholders” (Jones 1995, 
p. 407). He continues by arguing that contracts vary in form, including exchanges, 
transactions, the delegation of decision-making authority and formal legal 
documents. Moreover, Jensen & Meckling continues that the organization can be 
seen as a ‘nexus of contracts’ between stakeholders and the organization itself 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976 in Jones 1995, p. 407). Thus, decision-makers can be 
seen as having a direct or indirect contract with various influential (or critical) 
stakeholders who are able to influence their choices (Jones 1995, p. 407).  
Consequently, stakeholder influence can be one of the reasons why decisions 
differ between different organizations. Ansoff & McDonnell claim that three 
causes can explain different organizational behavior (or that different choices are 
made), which are organizational objectives, responsibilities and constraints 
(1987, p. 53). First, organizational objectives are certain “decision rules which 
enable management to guide and measure the firm’s performance toward its 
purpose” which respond to aspirations of external influential stakeholders. 
Second, responsibilities are “obligations which the firm undertakes to discharge”. 
Third, constraints are “decision rules which exclude certain options from the 
firm’s freedom actions” (Ansoff & McDonnell 1987, p. 53). Similarly, 
Christensen et al argues that when comparing public and private organizations one 
can identify three fundamentally different features by which three concepts can be 
derived. First, public organizations are responsible to a democratically elected 
leadership and the people, whilst private organizations are liable to a board of 
directors and stockholders (Christensen et al 2005, p. 16–19). Hence, 
accountability is a variable that affects decision-making. By accountability I refer 
to contracts with stakeholders and stakeholder influence which depends on 
centrality and density of the critical stakeholders. Second, public organizations are 
‘multifunctional’ [my translation] meaning that they have to regard several, 
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sometimes conflicting, goals and democratic values such as transparency, 
predictability, equality, neutrality, service quality, political loyalty and cost 
efficiency, in contrast to private organizations which have one essential target; to 
generate profit (Christensen et al 2005, p. 16–19). Therefore, organizational goals 
will determine decision-making. Third, public and private organizations usually 
do not operate in the same context, public organizations usually exists on markets 
characterized by imperfections and private on markets with competition. Hence, 
the organizations responsibilities will affect what decisions that are being made. 
But also the environmental context which contains national regulations and 
legislation will affect the organizational responsibilities (Christensen et al 2005, p. 
16–19). Ansoff & McDonnell differs between responsibilities and constraints 
which includes legislation (Ansoff & McDonnell 1987, p. 53). The concept of 
responsibilities can be perceived as confusing because a private firm has a 
responsibility to generate profit to its stakeholders and are thus accountable to 
them. However, they are also responsible to follow the legislation which can be 
seen as a constraint to the organizations activities or limits the veto player’s 
choices. Therefore, I will use Ansoff & McDonnell’s term of constraints instead 
of responsibilities which was derived from Christensen et al (2005). Likewise, I 
will use the term of accountability from Christensen et al instead of Ansoff & 
McDonnell’s organizational objectives but in accordance with Freeman argue that 
the organizational objectives are responses to aspirations of external influential 
stakeholders (Freeman 2010, p. 33). Finally, I will use the concept of 
organizational goals according to Christensen et al instead of and similar to 
Ansoff & McDonnell’s responsibilities. Fourth, I also argue that personal interests 
of decision-makers will determine what decisions are made, however I will not 
include this aspect in my study (Friedman & Miles2006, p. 5, Jacobsen & 
Thorsvik 2008, p. 338). 
Finally, how the decisions or ‘strategic choices’ are executed are through 
implementation of the organization’s realized strategy (Jacobsen & Thorsvik 
2008, p. 39). Business professor Chandler wrote in his book Strategy and 
Structure that “strategy can be defined as the determination of the basic long-term 
goals and objectives of an enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action and the 
allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these goals” (Chandler 1962 in 
Heracleous 2003, p. 4). Thus, the strategy articulates the organizational targets 
and aspirations (Jacobsen & Thorsvik 2008, p. 339). 
3.3 Comparing public and private organizations 
In this section I will compare public and private organizations and try to 
distinguish how and if these two organization types differ through veto players 
and the abovementioned concepts of accountability, organizational goals and 
constraints. I will begin by merely focus on the divergences between public and 
private organizations and thereafter introduce and compare new types of private 
organizations with the existing public and private ideal types. 
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3.3.1 Veto player 
As mentioned in section 3.2.3 regarding decision-making and strategy within 
organizations, the veto player is that actor that can make the strategic choices 
within the organization. By observing figure 2.1 and 2.2 in chapter two one can 
identify that both public and private organizations are distinguished by a 
hierarchical organizational type, where the education provider presumably is the 
veto player. Thus, when comparing the public and private veto player the figures 
demonstrate that whilst the veto player in public organizations are politicians, they 
are represented by a legal person in private organizations where the decision-
makers or critical stakeholders consist of natural persons or a board of directors 
that appoints a CEO which are delegated the decision-making power (see for 
example Hatch 2002, p. 300, Oxelheim & Wihlborg 2008, p. 11–13, 185). 
3.3.2 Accountability 
The question of who can influence a decision depends on the degree of connection 
with the veto player. Aforesaid, by accountability I refer to contracts with 
stakeholders and stakeholder influence which, according to Rowley, depends on 
critical stakeholders’ centrality and density. The concept of centrality can be 
describe through three further concepts; degree, closeness and betweeness. The 
first term, degree, refers to how well-connected the stakeholders is with the 
decision-maker and other actors. Second, closeness describes an actor’s 
possibility to access other relevant actors, were low closeness implies that an actor 
is dependent on other actors to access relevant actors. Third, betweeness is the 
ability to control other actor’s closeness to relevant actors (Rowley 1997, p. 899). 
My understanding of centrality will be based on all of the abovementioned 
concepts but I will use the term centrality and thus meaning the stakeholder’s 
degree of closeness to the veto player, for example in a public school where the 
veto player is the education provider or the Municipal Assembly and where the 
Committee have the responsibility to investigate and prepare for the a decision-
making support for the assembly. The concept of density however can be defined 
as number of stakeholder connections where “the interconnectedness of relational 
networks influences an organization's degree of resistance to institutional 
pressures” (Oliver 1991 in Rowley 1997, p. 896). Furthermore, Rowley states that 
“as network density increases, the ability of a focal organization's stakeholders to 
constrain the organization's actions increases” (Rowley 1997, p. 899). I will 
understand the concept of density as size matter, for example, in private 
organizations stockholders are great in numbers and therefore have a possibility to 
affect the stakeholders distinguished by centrality, whereas in public organizations 
citizens can affect the elected political leadership. 
Thus, when comparing public and private organizations public organizations 
are responsible to a democratically elected leadership which is liable to the people 
and private organizations are accountable to a board of directors and its owners or 
stockholders (Christensen et al 2005, p. 16–19, Jacobsen & Thorsvik 2008, p. 25–
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27). Moreover, according to Chubb and Moe, the main difference between public 
and private organizations is the factor of social control whereas public 
organizations or schools are subordinated the hierarchical system of democratic 
politics and private organizations are market controlled. Accordingly, public 
schools are directly controlled by society through the democratic system in terms 
of public administration, in the municipalities in Sweden, whilst private 
organizations are instead indirectly controlled by the society through market 
forces (Chubb & Moe 1988, p. 1065–1067). 
3.3.3 Organizational goals 
According to Chubb & Moe (1988) the organizational context is interlinked with 
organizational goals where the differences between public and private 
organizational goals are that targets in private organizations often are more clear 
and homogenous, whilst objectives in public organizations are characterized by 
many different often conflicting goals due to the democratic control (p. 1079–
1080). Correspondingly, Christensen et al (2005) argues that public organizations 
are ‘multifunctional’ [my translation] meaning that they have to regard several, 
sometimes conflicting, goals and democratic values such as transparency, 
predictability, equality, neutrality, service quality, political loyalty and cost 
efficiency (p. 16–19).  
In contrast to private organizations which have one essential target; to 
maximize profit (ibid., Cyert & March 1963, p. 8). Thus, while public 
organizations aim at multifunctional goals Friedman (1970) similarly argues that 
the “one and only social responsibility of business” is for the private organizations 
is to increase stockholder value, or profit. In a governmental committee report it is 
emphasized that according to The Swedish Companies Act (ABL) (SFS 
2005:551) the main principle for a limited company is that the operations are 
conducted in order to provide its shareholders profit. However that it is possible 
for the organizations to have other objectives as well (Dir. 2015:22, Fi 2012:11, 
SOU 2015:7). 
In summary, to understand the distinctions between public and private 
organizational goals one can apply Freeman’s model of different types of 
strategies which distinguish between a utilitarian and a stockholder strategy 
(Freeman 2010, p. 102–105). Thus, private organizational targets can be described 
with the stockholder strategy which according to Freeman aims at: (a) “maximize 
benefits to stockholders”, and (b) “maximize benefits to financial stakeholders”. 
Public organizational goals on the other hand can be linked to Freeman’s 
utilitarian strategy, which includes the ambitions to: (a) “maximize benefits to all 
stakeholders (greatest good for greatest number)”, (b) “maximize average welfare 
level of all stakeholders”, and (c) “maximize benefits to society” (Freeman 2010, 
p. 102). 
 
  26 
3.3.4 Constraints 
Drawing on scholars Chubb and Moe (1988) who argue that organizations are 
products of the environment context which they are embedded in (p. 1066), the 
policy or environmental context can be viewed as constraints or limits of the 
alternative choices or decisions that can be made within an organization or as the 
‘rules of the game’. Consequently, constraints are defined as “decision rules 
which exclude certain options from the firm’s freedom actions” (Ansoff & 
McDonnell 1987, p. 53). 
In the Swedish educational system public and private organizations are 
subordinate to the same constraints in terms of regulations and legislation, for 
example government control through the Education Act and determined 
benchmarks which are controlled by government agencies (SFS 2010:800, 
Skolinspektionen 1, Skolverket 2, SOU 2013:56, p. 159–166). 
However, one essential distinction between public and private organizations is 
the constraint that public schools have the overall education responsibility, 
meaning that no student should be without education (SFS 2010:800). 
Accordingly, public schools can be considered as the default option where 
students that have not made an active choice of school are assigned to a public 
school closest to where they live (Böhlmark & Lindahl 2013, p. 7, Chubb & Moe 
1988, p. 1068). This also signifies that public schools are all-inclusive and cannot 
select which students they want in their school, but they are guaranteed that new 
students will start every school year (Chubb & Moe 1988, p. 1079–1080).  
Contrariwise, private schools are dependent on the fact that parents (and 
students) select their school. Since school vouchers are paid to the education 
provider based on the number of students that are enrolled in the school, making 
sure that students and parents selects their school is crucial for the survival of 
independent schools. Private organizations therefore have to market their school 
to attract students, but they also have to meet the preferences and interests of the 
customers, the students and their parents, to keep them from changing schools. 
Therefore, the constraint for private organizations is their reputation (Chubb & 
Moe 1988, p. 1067–1068, 1070, Dixit 2002, p. 720, Hirschman 1970).  
3.4 Introducing hybrid organizations 
In previous sections I have focused on the distinctions between public and private 
organizations in terms of organizational structure, stakeholder influence and 
decision-making. However, Bozeman states in his book All Organizations are 
Public that the distinctions between public and private organizations, in some 
areas, are gradually dissolving creating new organizational types which often are 
hybrids between the traditional public and private types (Bozeman in Christensen 
et al 2005, p. 15). I argue that the Swedish school market is one of these areas 
where the publicly funded private organizations, the independent schools, are best 
described as hybrids rather than being denominated as one coherent private 
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organization category. Therefore, in an attempt to enhance understanding of the 
organizations within this group this section introduces three new categories based 
on ownership structure of the education provider that can be found within the 
private organization group. The categories are based on the works of Elacqua et al 
(2011a, 2001b), Elacqua (2014) and Ford and Kaserman (2000)
6
 which divides 
private organizations into groups of for-profit and non-profit organizations
7
. 
Thereafter, within the for-profit category organizations can be further divided into 
the subgroups of autonomous for-profit organizations and for-profit franchises 
(Elacqua 2014, p. 3, 10–14, SOU 2013:56, p. 94). 
In schools that belong to the non-profit organization category the education 
provider is a member based organization that reinvests its profits into the 
organization’s activities to achieve a specific organizational objective. Thus, it is 
accountable to its members and a board of directors often makes decisions 
regarding the organization’s activities (Bolagsverket 1, Fenger 2006, p. 76–77, 
Ramia 2006, p. 185–197, Salamon & Anheier, p. 12–16, SOU 2013:56, p. 95–96, 
White 2006, 45–47). 
In autonomous for-profit organizations the education provider is a limited 
company, like in for-profit franchises, however these schools are independent and 
does not belong to a school chain. The education provider can be owned by either 
one or more natural persons, both outsiders and insiders such as teachers or 
principals, or legal persons, for example a religious community. Hence, 
stakeholder accountability, decision-making and organizational goals depend on 
the organizational structure (Bolagsverket 2, SFS 2005:551). 
Similarly, for-profit franchises are also organizations that are owned by one or 
more legal persons, however in for-profit franchises the company or legal person 
that own the education provider is part of a group of companies. It can be argued 
that these organizations are most similar to the private organization type because 
of their liability to their shareholders and a clear organizational goal of 
maximizing profits to stockholders (Bolagsverket 2, Friedman 1970, SFS 
2005:551). 
In table 3.1 and 3.2 an overview of the different organizations is presented to 
identify the stakeholders and who can make decisions and therefore can be seen as 
veto player. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
6
 Ford and Kaserman (2000) analyzed service quality and ownership structure in the medical industry and 
divided for-profit organizations into two categories depending on whether they were physician-owned or 
corporate-owned clinics, similarly to the categories presented by Elacqua et al (2011a, 2011b) and Elacqua 
(2014). First, in the article Do better schools scale up? Elacqua et al (2011a) compares education quality in 
Chilean independent
6
 for-profit schools and for-profit school chains. Second, in Elacqua et al (2011b) the 
effectiveness of these school chains or for-profit school franchises is analyzed. Third, in the working paper from 
2014 Elacqua examine and analyze the differences between Chilean student achievement and school 
effectiveness in different public, non-profit and for-profit schools (Elacqua et al 2011a, p.3–5, Elacqua 2014, p. 
1–2, 22–23). 
7
 When studying organizations these are usually divided into three categories whether they belong to the market, 
the state or the third sector. However, in the Swedish school system the division has been between the public 
schools and the independent which includes both private profit seeking organizations and third sector non-profit 
organizations (Fenger 2006, p. 76–77, Ramia 2006, p. 185–197, SOU 2013:56, p. 95–96, White 2006, 45–47). 
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First, table 3.1 provides an insight into which the stakeholders are in the 
Swedish school system. The table differentiates between public and independent 
schools and the three different categories introduced earlier. The overarching 
stakeholders for the independent schools are students, parents, employees 
(teachers), principal, government and government agencies exist for all 
organizations and the others are variations for each category. 
 
Table 3.1 Schools divided by education provider 
School type Management type Stakeholders 
Public Municipal Students, Parents, Teachers, Principal, 
Public administrators, Municipal Assembly, 
Committee, Citizens, Government, 
Government Authorities 
Independent  Students, Parents, Teachers, Principal, 
Government, Government Authorities 
 For-profit franchises Shareholders, Board members, Managing 
directors, Owners 
 Autonomous for-profit 
organizations 
Board members, Owners 
 Non-profit organization Organization members, Board members 
Source: Dixit 2002, p. 719, SOU 2013:56, p. 95–96 
 
Second, table 3.2 illustrates stakeholders within the organizations that can, 
according to the organizational context, make the decisions and are potential veto 
players. 
 
Table 3.2 Levels of decision-making within Swedish schools 
Type of 
decision 
Organizational 
level 
Stakeholders Example of decision 
Strategic Top-level Education provider, CEO, 
politicians, owner, board 
members 
Determining the goals of 
the organization 
Tactical Middle-level Principal Implementation of the 
organization’s goals 
Operational Lower levels Principal, teacher Execution of 
organization’s goals 
Source: Oxelheim & Wihlborg 2008, p. 12, 184–185.  
 
Why the organizational quality output differs has in the theoretical sections 
been argued to be interlinked with stakeholder influence. Thus, based on the 
previous tables which presented stakeholder differences between the hybrid and 
public organizations this leads us to the hypothesis of this study.  
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Hypothesis 1. Public and independent schools will not pursue quality in the 
same manner. However, as the independent schools are a heterogeneous group 
these organizations will also not understand and pursue quality in the same 
manner due to stakeholder influence. But these organizations will more likely 
understand and pursue quality according to the newly introduced categories 
within the independent school group. There will be a difference of which 
organizations that will prioritize public strategies over private strategies, where 
for-profit franchises most likely will pursue quality similar to the private strategy, 
followed by autonomous for-profit schools and non-profit schools which will 
pursue quality most similar to the public strategy. 
3.5 Analytical framework of stakeholder strategies 
As mentioned in earlier sections why organizations’ quality pursuit differs 
depends on the organizational structure, the stakeholders and the veto player of 
the organization who makes the strategic choice about the organizational goals 
which can be distinguished in the organization’s realized strategy. Why decisions 
differ can be identified by applying the framework based on Christansen et al and 
Ansoff & McDonnell which focuses on differences in accountability, 
organizational goals and constraints. Furthermore, the organizational goals can 
be found in the organizations realized strategy based on the concepts from 
Freeman or what decision that have been made regarding the quality pursuit in 
terms of: result quality, structure quality, process quality and brand (the 
differences in quality pursuit is further discussed in the operationalization in 
section 4.3) 
In table 3.3 (below) I have combined the abovementioned theories into one 
coherent framework which attempt to identify the differences of the two different 
organizations. 
 
  
The aim is to apply this framework on both the public and the hybrid 
organizations; the non-profit, autonomous for profit and for-profit franchise 
organizations; to try to position them in relation to the introduced types of public 
Table 3.3: Differences of veto player, stakeholder influence and 
organization in public and private organizations 
  Public organization Private organization 
Veto player Municipal Assembly CEO 
Accountability 
 
  
Centrality Committee Board of directors 
Density Citizens 
Stockholders, 
Customers 
Organizational goals Utilitarian Stockholder  
Constraints All-inclusive Reputation 
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and private organizations and to answer the hypothesis that were presented in the 
theoretical chapter.  
  31 
4 Methodology 
Whilst the previous chapter provided the theoretical basis of the study by 
discussing organizations, stakeholder influence and decision-making, this next 
chapter provides the methodological choices of this thesis. The chapter contains 
discussions regarding case study design, case selection, interview method and the 
operationalization of the analytical framework that was presented in chapter 3. 
4.1 Case study design 
The aim of research in the social sciences is according to King, Keohane & Verba 
(1994) to “produce valid inferences about social and political life” (p. 3). 
Approaching social and political phenomena and conducting social research 
however, entails a variety of methodological considerations. One of these 
considerations concerns the choice of research strategy that will guide how the 
empirical evidence will be collected, presented and analyzed (Yin 2003, p. 1, 3).  
King, Keohane & Verba argues that there are two styles of research strategies; 
qualitative and quantitative research. These two research styles are often referred 
to as small-n and large-N studies, suggesting that the essential difference between 
the two strategies is the number of cases that are included in the study. The 
advantages of each research strategy often includes the possibility for quantitative 
studies to provide general descriptions by using statistical measures for analyzing 
multiple cases, while the advantages of doing qualitative research concerns the 
ability to achieve more in-depth analyzes of specific cases and complex 
phenomena that are hard to measure which can increase understanding and 
expand existing theories (Bryman 2012, p. 35–38, 407–408, George & Bennett 
2005, p. 17, 19, King, Keohane & Verba 1994, p. 3–5).  
For this study I have chosen a case study design which is a research design 
belonging to the qualitative research strategy. Drawing on Yin, a case study is an 
“empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-
life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident” (Yin 2003, p. 13). Thus, case studies are research designs 
that can contribute to our knowledge of phenomena such as individuals, groups 
and organizations (ibid, p. 1, Bryman 2012, p. 67–68, Lundquist 1993, p. 104–
105). 
Case studies can be designed in multiple fashions, however according to Yin 
the main difference is between multiple and single case study designs (Yin 2003, 
p. 14–15, 39). It is often argued that multiple or comparative case studies, which 
compare two or more cases, are preferred over single case studies because of their 
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possibility to do more observations which enhance generalizability. However, it is 
also possible for a single case study to encompass many observations. By 
conducting a within-case analysis or an embedded case study, not to be mistaken 
from cross-case analysis which would be referred to as a comparative case study, 
more units of analysis can be included. For example, in this study the case is the 
Swedish school market where the organizations and the stakeholders can be 
regarded as multiple subunits which can be analyzed and compared with each 
other and then related to the larger unit of analysis (Esaiasson et al 2007, p. 122, 
George & Bennett 2005, p. 18, 32, Lundquist 1993, p. 113, Teorell & Svensson 
2007, p. 11, Yin 2003, p. 41–53). 
Finally, the research objective of this within-case analysis can best be 
described as a plausibility probe. According to George and Bennett (2005) this 
research objective is used for determining whereas preliminary or untested 
theories require further testing (p. 75, 111). 
4.1.1 Generalizability, validity and reliability 
To ensure and judge the quality of a research design a number of criteria have to 
be fulfilled. The criteria concern the ability for the researcher to achieve 
trustworthiness, credibility and objectivity and can be measured through the 
concepts of external validity, internal validity and reliability (Bryman 2012, p. 
389–390, Yin 2003, p. 33–34). 
First, external validity refers to the possibility to generalize the study’s 
findings to other cases and social settings. When considering generalizability in 
qualitative research and single case studies these types of studies are often 
critiqued for providing little basis for scientific generalization, as for example 
experiments or statistical inferences (Bryman 2012, p. 71, 390). However, Yin 
argues that there is a difference between statistical generalization provided by 
experiments and analytical generalization provided by case studies where the goal 
for conducting a case study is not to provide theoretical propositions to 
populations or universes but to “expand and generalize theories” (2003, p. 10, 32, 
40). Furthermore, King, Keohane & Verba (1994) argue that generalization “does 
not eliminate the importance of the particular. In fact, the very purpose of moving 
from the particular to the general is to improve our understanding of both” (p. 35). 
Second, the fact that case studies are concerned with analytical generalization 
also allows the researcher to achieve higher levels of internal validity than 
statistical studies (George & Bennett 2005, p. 19). Thus, internal validity refers to 
how well the researcher’s theoretical ideas correspond to and describes the 
observations. To achieve good internal validity the researcher must develop and 
establish clear operationalized measurements from the theoretical concepts in 
order to avoid making conclusions based on subjective judgments (Bryman 2012, 
p. 390, Esaiasson et al 2010, p. 63–65, Yin 2003, p. 34–36). 
Third, the concept of reliability can be defined as the possibility to replicate 
the study. The objective of reliability is to minimize unsystematic errors and avoid 
personal bias in the study so that if another researcher follows the same 
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procedures he would be able come to the same conclusions (Bryman 2012, p. 392, 
408, Esaiasson et al 2010, p. 70, Yin 2003, p. 37–38). 
4.1.2 Case selection 
I intend to do a case study of the school market in Malmö and the organizations 
within. Due to the reforms in late 1980s and early 1990s the responsibility for 
organizing education was decentralized to the municipalities which also were 
given the responsibility to finance the schools within the municipality by 
allocating school vouchers to each school, one can therefore argue that all 
municipalities are separate school markets (Holmlund et al 2014, p. 1, 19–21). 
The reason for selecting Malmö school market is because it can be viewed as a 
representative case because the school market in Malmö is similar to the national 
spread, where 16 percent of the students attend an independent school (Bryman 
2012, p. 70, Skolverket 1, Yin 2003, p. 40–41). 
To delimit the sample I will only include schools that are providing 9
th
 grade 
education and that are open for all students to select. Therefore, I am excluding 
for example schools for students with special needs or for hospitalized children. 
 Nevertheless, there are 106 comprehensive compulsory schools in Malmö. 
However, only 62 schools provide 9
th
 grade education and after excluding schools 
for students with special needs and/or which are hospitalized 48 schools remain. 
Among these schools two thirds of the schools are public and one third is 
independent. Hence, there are 32 public schools and 16 independent schools in 
Malmö that provides 9
th
 grade education. Furthermore, among the 16 independent 
schools there are 10 for-profit schools and 6 non-profit schools. Finally, the 
majority of the for-profit schools in Malmö are autonomous and only three 
schools belong to a for-profit franchise (Malmö Stad, Skolverket 1, 
Utbildningsinfo) (sees Appendix 1). 
4.2 Data collection: Interview technique 
According to Bryman (2012) “data collection represents a key point of any 
research project” (p. 12). The method for collecting data or empirical evidence 
depends on the type of research strategy and design of the study.  
One of the most common data collection methods in qualitative research is to 
do interviews. The advantages of doing interviews include the possibility to gain a 
more in-depth understanding of social phenomena, allow the respondents 
themselves to define what is of interest for them and gather rich and detailed 
information (Bryman 2012, p. 469–470, Gill et al 2008, p. 291). 
Furthermore, there are different types of qualitative interviews, including 
unstructured or semi-structured interviews. I intend to conduct semi-structured 
interviews where the person being interviewed functions as a respondent 
(Esaiasson et al 2010, p. 257–258). 
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What characterizes a respondent interview is that in this type of interview the 
researcher is interested in the respondent’s opinions and perceptions of a specific 
situation, whereas the researcher in an informant interview uses the interviewed 
person’s answers as a source of information about a specific situation (Esaiasson 
et al 2010, p. 259).  
The difference between an unstructured and a semi-structured interview is that 
a semi-structured interview is guided by an interview guide that includes a 
number of key questions and which provide the respondent with an outline of 
what to talk about (Bryman 2012, p. 470–471, Gill et al 2008, p. 291). The benefit 
of using a semi-structured approach is that the researcher has more flexibility to 
adapt the interview after the answers from the respondent (Bryman 2012, p. 12, 
470–472). The, disadvantage or hazard when doing a semi-structured interview is 
the possibility of asking leading or biased questions (Gill et al 2008, p. 293, Kvale 
et al 2009, p. 187–189). On the contrary, Gill et al (2008) suggest that good 
interview questions should be open-ended, neutral, sensitive and understandable 
(p. 292).   
The interview guide which guides the interviews of this study is divided into 
specific themes with a number of questions related to the theme (see Appendix 2). 
4.2.1 Respondent selection 
The aim with the interviews was to contact education providers and principals 
because they are the actors responsible for the organizations service production 
and the quality of these services. Moreover, the respondents were selected through 
three different sampling measures. 
Through a strategic choice the sample was limited to include respondents, one 
principal and one education provider, from each of the four organizational groups, 
based on the ownership structure, which are; public organizations, non-profit 
organizations, for-profit franchises and autonomous for-profit organizations as 
demonstrated in table A.2 in appendix 2.  
Thereafter, the selection of specific respondents within each category was 
made through random and convenience sampling where education providers and 
principals within each organizational group were randomly contacted, selected 
based on accessibility and represented each organization group (Patton 1990, p. 
176, 180, 183, Trost 2010, p. 137–141). I have conducted seven interviews with 
one principal and education provider from each of the four organization types, and 
where one of the respondent where both the principal and education provider of 
the school. One limitation of this sample strategy is that each respondent 
represents the entire group which excludes the possibility to find variations within 
each organizational category. 
Regarding the issue of sample size, or the number of respondents to include in 
the study, Patton argues that “there are no rules for sample size in qualitative 
inquiry” (Patton 1990, p. 184). It is rather a matter of time and resources and 
being able to attain the necessary information to be able to answer the research 
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question (Trost 2010, p. 143–144, Patton 1990, p. 184). Nevertheless, Kvale et al 
(2009) argues that 15 +/- 10 interviews are a good number (p. 129–131).  
4.2.2 Ethical considerations 
When conducting interviews the researcher is committed to follow a number of 
ethical principles, including informed consent, confidentiality and objectivity. If 
the respondent is informed of the study and know what to expect of the interview 
situation and also guaranteed confidentiality or anonymity the likelihood that the 
respondent is honest increases (Bryman 2012, p. 135, Gill et al 2008, p. 292, 
Kvale et al 2009, p. 78–79). 
Informed consent concerns the researcher’s obligation to provide respondents 
with enough information about the details of the study so they are able to make an 
informed decision about whether they want to participate in the study or not 
(Bryman 2012, p. 138, Gill et al 2008, p. 292). The researcher should also inform 
the respondents about confidentiality.  
Confidentiality refers to the question of what information that should be 
available for whom. This also includes the issue of guaranteeing respondents’ 
anonymity and ensuring that they are “not identified or identifiable” (Bryman 
2012, p. 136). 
Furthermore, Trost argues that direct quotes should be avoided unless the 
researcher particularly is interested in how the respondent formulated his answer 
or it is necessary for the understanding (Trost 2010, p. 157). 
It is also essential for the quality of the study that the researcher is objective 
and professional throughout the study, meaning that the researcher presents 
information neutrally and in a scientific manner (Kvale et al 2009, p. 90–92). 
4.2.3 Interview recordings and transcriptions 
The interviews were held in Swedish, lasted for approximately 30 minutes each 
and were recorded after the consent from the respondent. Trost (2009) states that 
recording interviews is a matter of the researcher’s personal preferences, however, 
he argues that the advantages of recording exceed the disadvantages of doing so 
(p. 74). Among the advantages of recording interviews is the fact that the 
researcher does not need to focus on writing down the respondent’s answers, but 
can participate and interact with the respondent more actively by following up on 
interesting points. Furthermore, by recording the interviews the researcher is able 
to go back and listen to the material again which enables the researcher to detect 
not just what the respondent said but the way the respondent said it (Bryman 
2012, p. 482). The disadvantages include the fact that the respondent may become 
more self-conscious which could result in that they share less than they would 
have done if the interview had not been recorded (Bryman 2012, p. 483, Trost 
2009, p. 75–76). 
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4.3 Operationalization 
According to Teorell & Svensson (2007) operationalization is to construct validity 
and to make “abstract concepts measurable” [my translation] (p. 55), which Yin 
claims is one of the most essential stages in the research process, especially when 
conducting single case studies (Yin 2003, p. 45). 
To be able to answer the research question of how stakeholders influence how 
the organizations on the Swedish school market understand and pursue quality in 
educational provision I argue that it is necessary to answer three crucial questions 
regarding who is the veto player and can make decisions regarding quality pursuit, 
what is the strategy for the organizations quality pursuit and why does decisions 
differ.  
By asking the respondents about responsibilities and who makes certain 
decisions types of decisions, strategic, tactical and operational, I aim to identify 
the veto player. 
To identify what quality approach that is pursued within the organization the 
concepts of result quality, structure quality, process quality and brand are 
operationalized (SOU 2013:56, p. 214, 239). The indicators that are used for 
measuring the different quality orientations are based on a governmental report 
which determines; results quality as grades or test scores on national tests and 
overall student performances (SOU 2013, p. 240); structure quality as the number 
of teachers, number of authorized teachers, presence of certain facilities such as 
library with librarians, student health care, school canteen, sports hall, or 
expenditures on teaching, facilities, school meals, teaching materials, student care. 
However, it is questioned whether expenditures and the presence of certain 
facilities affect quality, therefore I am only including number of teachers and 
licensed teachers (SOU 2013:56, p. 241); process quality as the learning 
environment in terms of the schools’ ability to create a safe environment for the 
students by for example addressing problems with bullying or discrimination, 
student and parent satisfaction and student well-being or satisfaction (SOU 
2013:56, 242); and brand as school niche or educational approach (SOU 2013, p. 
242). 
What quality goals the organization focuses on can be found in their strategy, 
in following table 4.3 the different strategies for reaching the different 
organizational goals is displayed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3 Operationalization of organizational strategies for reaching 
organizational goals 
  Public org. strategy Private org. strategy 
Results quality Knowledge Grades 
Structure quality Authorized teachers No. of teachers 
Process quality Learning environment Student well-being 
Brand General Niched 
  37 
Based on Freeman’s utilitarian and stockholder strategy we can derive a 
strategy for public and private organizations, where public organizations are 
basing their goals on the utilitarian strategy and where private organizations bases 
their goals on stockholder strategy. Chubb and Moe (1988) have found that 
private schools focus on fewer objectives than the public schools, but also that 
their goals have a more organizational focus, could be viewed as more short-term 
and had clear determined measurable performance standards (p. 1079–1081).  
Why quality strategies differ is discussed through the concepts on 
accountability, organizational goals and constraints that were presented in 
chapter three.  
By discussing the market type and the voucher design the link between the 
concepts and organizational strategies becomes clearer. First, as mentioned in 
previous sections Gingrich (2011) defines the Swedish school market as a 
Consumer Controlled market, meaning that the customers or parents and students 
have the control to decide what school they want their children to attend. A 
system that is characterized by consumer control is believed to force organizations 
to increase quality of their services to attract students (Gingrich 2011, p. 152–156, 
Stiglitz 2000, p. 434–435). For this system to be effective consumers must have 
perfect information about the different alternatives and quality. Moreover, as 
education quality is a diffuse concept this leads to a situation where parents have 
limited information about the different choices on the market and have to rely on 
the information of the organizations.  
On the other hand, in Sweden school vouchers are paid equally to all 
educational providers depending on the number of students that are enrolled in the 
school. Since the independent schools are not guaranteed students, like the public 
schools, getting students to select their schools is crucial for the survival of the 
school. By having students selecting their school the organization secures funding 
for the school’s activities. Therefore, to get students to select their school private 
organizations uses marketing strategies to attract students (Chubb & Moe 1988, p. 
1067–1068, Hirschman 1970). Due to the information asymmetry the consumers, 
parents and students, have limited information about the school quality and will 
judge quality based on the characteristics of the school and students in the school. 
Therefore, organizations market themselves with information that parents 
comprehend as quality indicators, such as school niche, high student grades, small 
class sizes or many teachers per students and student well-being (Ladd 2002, p. 
4). Furthermore, to get students to stay in the school organizations needs to focus 
on customer satisfaction. Thus, as public schools focuses on student performance 
in their of long-term knowledge goals, private organizations focuses on more 
short-term measurable results, such as grades. Regarding the structure quality the 
NAE concludes in a report that public schools generally have a higher number of 
authorized teachers than independent schools, which can be a result of that private 
schools market themselves as having small class sizes, or that public schools are 
accountable to politicians and therefore are more likely to focus on implementing 
policies than market themselves with small class sizes (Skolverket 3, p. 1, 18–19). 
In table 4.4 I present the public and private quality strategies. 
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Table 4.4: Operationalization of stakeholder influence and public and 
private views of quality 
  Public strategy Private strategy 
Accountability 
 
  
Centrality Politicians CEO 
Density Citizens Stockholders, Customers 
Organizational goals 
 
  
Results quality Knowledge Grades 
Structure quality Authorized teachers No. of teachers 
Process quality Learning environment Student well-being 
Brand General Niched 
Constraints All-inclusive Reputation 
Based on background and theoretical chapters (see figure 2.1 and 2.2) 
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5 Analysis 
In this chapter I will tie my theoretical framework to my findings from the 
interviews. The aim of the interviews is to analyze the hybrids to be able to find 
out who the veto players are, which stakeholders they are accountable to, what 
strategy that was used for reaching the organizations’ quality goals and what 
constraints the organizations have, to be able to answer the research question; 
How do stakeholders influence how the organizations on the Swedish school 
market understand and pursue quality in educational provision?. The findings 
will be sorted after school or organization type and presented within these groups 
where they will be discussed in accordance with the theoretical concepts of 
accountability, organizational goals and constraints. In the second sections I will 
compare and interlink the results with each other and the analytical framework 
presented in the methodological chapter. Thereafter I aim to discuss the findings 
in comparison with the hypotheses presented in the introductory chapter. Lastly, I 
will summarize and emphasize important findings. 
5.1 Empirical findings 
The interviews will be analyzed within each organization group. There are two 
respondents within each group, principals and education providers, except for the 
autonomous for-profit organization category where the education provider also 
functions as the principal. The respondents are labeled respondent A–G, where 
respondent A is the education provider of a public school, respondent B is the 
education provider of a for-profit franchise, respondent C is the principal of a 
public school, respondent D is both the education provider and principal of an 
autonomous for-profit school, respondent E is the principal of a non-profit school, 
respondent F is the education provider of a non-profit school, and respondent G is 
the principal of a school belonging to a for-profit franchise. To ensure anonymity 
all respondents will be referred to as he. 
5.1.1 Public schools 
According to the analytical framework the veto player of a public organization is 
argued to be the municipal assembly which officially takes the decisions but 
where the education provider consists of both the assembly and a committee 
which are assisted by an administration. Since the committee prepares decisions 
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prior to decision-making it is suggested that it´s position is characterized by 
centrality (Ds. 2004:31). 
 The answers from respondent A, the education provider, support the 
analytical framework and reveal a hierarchical structure where the education 
provider has limited contact with the principals but have delegated this 
responsibility to the administration which is the link between the education 
provider and the schools (Respondent A 2015). Respondent C, the principal, 
confirms the statements from respondent A regarding the division of 
responsibilities between the education provider and the principal, and where 
communication with the education provider channels through the administration 
(Respondent C 2015). 
Furthermore, the respondents’ answers regarding the veto player also supports 
the presumption that the education provider is the veto player. Respondent A 
states that the general responsibility for the education provider is to provide the 
conditions and facilitate for the schools to be able to achieve the national goals 
and make general decisions regarding for example management of facilities, 
resource allocation and contact with government agencies, but the education 
provider also have the responsibility to employ the principals. The principal’s 
responsibilities on the other hand include the pedagogical leadership, to control 
the organization’s transaction process, implement goals and handle the relations 
with the students and teachers (Respondent A 2015). 
Regarding decision-making the respondent emphasizes that the education 
provider can make all decisions except those decisions that according to the 
Education Act are defined as the principals’ (Respondent A 2015).  
Likewise, respondent C describes the principal’s responsibilities as the general 
responsibility for the activities within the school, to follow-up, report and ensure 
that the school’s activities and students attain determined goals, responsibility for 
the school’s employees and contact with unions. The education provider has the 
responsibility for all schools in the municipality, have contact with government 
agencies and to support principals to be able to reach their goals. But the principal 
is also responsible for that teachers attend professional development courses 
(Respondent C 2015), suggesting that there is a value in having authorized 
teachers. 
Moreover, respondent A describes a hieratical decision-making process where 
decisions regarding organizational goals trickle down from the top or the 
government to the municipalities and then down to the principals within the 
organizations. However, when formulating organizational goals respondent A 
states that it is the politicians’ responsibility to formulate goals though after input 
from the  organizations where the challenges in the schools guides how the 
national goals are implemented but also what national goals that are prioritized. 
Furthermore, it is the education provider’s responsibility to inform the principal 
about the perceived problems in his or her organization and then it is the 
principal’s responsibility to take action and solve the identified problems 
(Respondent A 2015). This suggests that the principal is concerned with the 
tactical an operational decisions while the strategic decisions about goal 
formulation. 
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When discussing accountability respondent A emphasizes that politicians are 
elected by and represent the people and therefore they are primarily accountable 
to the citizens. He continues by stating that the municipality also is accountable to 
the government because they provide a service commissioned by the government 
(Respondent A 2015). Since, the implementation of political ambition is argued to 
be the main task for the veto player it suggests that the citizens’ influence over 
decision making can be argued to be distinguished by density.  
When defining quality respondent A enumerates a number of different 
approaches to the concept. First, that quality can be defined as goal attainment of 
the national goals. Secondly, that quality also concerns the schools’ general 
mission which is to break social patterns and give all students equal opportunities. 
Third, that quality is that all students are given equal opportunities to pass all parts 
or courses of the education. Similar to respondent A, respondent C defines quality 
as the ability to produce a good service for the student that attend the school by 
following national regulations. But also to help students build knowledge and 
graduate with grades that they deserve (Respondent A 2015, Respondent C 2015). 
In accordance with the analytical framework respondent A confirms that the 
indicators that are used to measure quality focuses on students’ knowledge results 
which is a combined measurement constituted of grades, test scores on national 
tests and student development reviews, but also on the working or learning 
environment within the organization. Surveys are used where students can express 
their opinions about the schools’ activities. However, respondent A argues that the 
mission to provide students with basic knowledge that will help them through 
school and pass all courses can break social patterns is more important than for 
example well-being (Respondent A 2015). Respondent C explains that in his 
school quality is measured through grades, test results and student surveys 
focusing on students’ views of the learning environment in the school which is 
determined by the education provider, however as a local initiative the school also 
distributes surveys measuring student well-being (Respondent C 2015).  
Furthermore, respondent A claims that when evaluating quality levels in 
different organizations one must consider the factors that can impede a school’s 
ability to produce a high quality outcome, in terms of grades, for example the 
school’s catchment area which the organization have no power to influence 
(Respondent A 2015). Correspondingly, respondent C supports the public 
schools’ all-inclusive constraint, where he argues that the key constraint for public 
schools to achieve a high quality output is the public schools’ responsibility to 
admit all students, thus the inability to select students (Respondent C 2015). 
5.1.2 Non-profit schools 
Starting with the hybrid category of non-profit organizations in which, according 
to the Swedish Companies Registration Office, the education provider generally 
consists of a board (Bolagsverket 1). Both respondent E, the principal, and 
respondent F, the education provider, confirm this statement. Respondent E and 
respondent F both continue to describe that the board consists of parents to 
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students enrolled in the school which are elected on a yearly basis by the 
organization’s members on an annual meeting and that the board has the general 
responsibility for the school (Respondent E 2015, Respondent F 2015). 
Regarding the division of responsibilities, respondent F proceeds by 
emphasizing that the education provider has the ultimate responsibility to make 
sure that the school follows national goals and legislation, but that the board has 
delegated this responsibility along with the responsibility for the pedagogical 
work to the principal and that the principal is accountable to the board. 
Furthermore, that the education provider has the responsibility for long-term 
organizational strategies (Respondent F 2015). Contrariwise, respondent E argues 
that the principal’s responsibilities include a pedagogical leadership and the 
general responsibility for the school’s activities. But the respondent also states 
that it is important for the principal to have enough insight in the organization’s 
processes and a close relation with the student health to gain a deeper 
understanding of the needs and performance of each student (Respondent E 2015). 
Both respondents emphasize the board’s responsibility to make general decisions, 
for example financial decisions and delegate certain decisions within the 
principal’s area of expertise. The principal on the other hand can make decisions 
regarding the pedagogical work, the implementation and execution of the 
organizational goals (Respondent E 2015, Respondent F 2015). This gives an 
indication that the veto player and the stakeholder that can make the strategic 
decision reading the organizational goals is the education provider which is the 
board and that the decisions that the principal can make concern the operational 
and the tactical ones.  
 However, and contrary to decision-making in public organizations the 
decision-making process in the non-profit organization is described as less 
hierarchical with closer connection between the board and the principal. 
Respondent E claims that the decision-making process is best explained as a 
dialogue between the board and the principal where the board values the expertise 
of the principal (Respondent e 2015). Furthermore, both respondents describes the 
communication between the board and the principal as close since the principal 
attends all board meetings where he reports if the organization reaches the 
determined goals and informs the board of the school’s needs and activities 
(Respondent E 2015, Respondent F 2015). For example the indicators that are 
used to measure quality are on the one hand determined on the national level (the 
national goals) and on the other hand by the principal in cooperation with the 
board (and the teachers) (Respondent E 2015). This is confirmed by respondent F 
which argues that the principal is responsible for the quality work. Furthermore, 
he claims that the board formulates visions for the school’s activities and that the 
principal have been delegated the responsibility to operationalize the visions to 
organizational goals. Hence, the operational goals are formulated and decided by 
the principal after approval from the board (Respondent F 2015). This suggests 
that the principal’s influence over the decision-making process can be described 
in the term of centrality.  
Proceeding to the organization’s understand of quality and what strategy that 
is used, both respondents state that the overarching goal of the school is to provide 
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the best possible education that equips students with adequate knowledge to 
succeed in life and prepares them for the labour market or for further studies 
(Respondent E 2015, Respondent F 2015). Respondent F continues by arguing 
that one indication of quality is the number of students that are eligible to apply to 
high school and another indication is the number of students that wants to 
continue studying. The school’s mission is therefore to motivate students and 
making sure that they provide a good learning environment. But good quality is 
also small class sizes with as few students as possible per teacher. Furthermore, 
quality is measured through national test scores, grades and average test scores, 
where the respondent emphasizes that the overarching goal is that all students 
should be able to go through school and get good enough grades to be able to 
apply for high school (Respondent F 2015). 
Respondent E defines quality as to progress no matter the starting point. 
Furthermore that quality is a multidimensional concept, which should include a 
dialogue between teachers and students. Therefore, working with quality includes 
both a focus on discussing fundamental norms and values with the students, 
having personal development dialogues with students, conducting formative 
assessments of students’ knowledge and measuring grades and national test 
scores. To be able to have close contact with each student, a shared responsibility 
for all students is required, but also skilled teachers and enough teachers per 
student to meet each student’s needs. However, the respondent argues that quality 
is not necessary concerned with a special educational approach and emphasizes 
that his school has a general educational approach (Respondent E 2015). 
When discussing accountability the respondent states that the organization is 
accountable to government agencies, the municipality and the parents 
(Respondent E 2015). Similarly, respondent F argues that the education provider 
is accountable to those that have legal claims on the school, for example 
government agencies, however, primarily the children and their parents. In 
addition, respondent F also argues that quality is also having a good reputation, 
which is essential for the school’s capability to attract customers, a good 
communication with parents and a good understanding of the parents’ 
expectations (Respondent F 2015). 
In summary, the respondents answers have provided an understanding that the 
organization’s view of quality is similar to the view of quality in the public 
organizations which is characterized by a knowledge driven organization where 
the organizational aim is to provide equal and adequate education that focuses on 
providing a good learning environment and getting all students to pass the courses 
and be able to apply for high school. This is different from the private strategy 
which instead focuses on that the students should achieve as high grades as 
possible. However, similar to the private strategy the non-profit organization is 
constrained by the fact that they need a good reputation to attract students. The 
organization is therefore forced to use certain marketing strategies to attract 
student, which in this case is that they focuses on having small class sizes and thus 
few students per teacher. Finally, through the concept of density the parents can 
be seen as having some influence over the veto player and the decisions that are 
made within the organization by both being the organizational constraint as 
  44 
customers and members of the organization with the possibility to elect the board 
members. 
5.1.3 Autonomous for-profit schools 
The category of autonomous for-profit schools has been argued to be the most 
heterogenic, where the education provider is either a natural or legal person. Who 
constitute the education provider depends on the number of owners and can be 
either an individual or a board (SOU 2013:56, p. 94–95). 
Thus, to be able to distinguish who the veto player is in the autonomous for-
profit school it is important to know that, respondent D is the owner and 
represents both the education provider and the principal of the school. However, 
the education provider consists of a board which includes five people where the 
principal is the head of the board. The division of responsibilities between the 
board and the principal is that the board has the general responsibility for the 
school and its activities, for example resource allocation, but also providing the 
conditions for the principal to be able to carry out the organization’s processes. 
The principal on the other hand has the responsibility to implement the 
organizational goals, the pedagogic work, the day-to-day decisions within the 
school and making sure that the activities functions as they should. Because of the 
respondent’s dual roles as both the principal and the education provider the 
division between the two roles sometimes can be a bit diffuse he states. Although, 
the respondent stresses that it is the education provider that has overall 
responsibility for decisions regarding the school and therefore is highest in the 
hierarchy (Respondent D 2015). Furthermore, since issues regarding the general 
responsibilities are discussed during board meetings respondent D claims that he 
identifies the board as the education provider. However, the goals which the 
organization pursues are not determined by the education provider but are 
formulated through discussions in different executive committees consisting of 
the principal and selected teachers or others from the staff. The respondent 
continues by saying that he has the mandate to make all the decisions if he wants 
to but discusses decisions regarding the overall responsibilities with the board and 
regarding the goals in the different committees (Respondent D 2015).  
The answers from the respondent suggest that the veto player is the owner 
rather than the board which constitutes the education provider and that the board 
and executive committees’ possibility to influence the veto player best can be 
described according to the term of centrality. 
When identifying which stakeholders that the veto player is accountable to 
respondent D claims that the principal has the responsibility for the contact with 
teachers, students and parents and that the education provider is also accountable 
to the students, parents and teachers but also with the municipality and 
government agencies (Respondent D 2015).  
Discussing organizational goals and quality the respondent states that the 
objectives of the school primarily concern the approach of the school, but also that 
all students attending the school should be able to pass all parts of the education 
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regardless of physical and psychological abilities. Respondent D further argues 
that there are various ways of measuring quality however that quality according to 
him primarily is the organization’s reputation. A good reputation implies that the 
organization’s processes and goal attainment are well functioning thus the 
organization is doing what it should be doing and have done that over a long 
period of time and for that reason the organization has earned a good reputation. 
To enhance quality the respondent also includes passion, niched organizations and 
personal interest therefore, for example employing the “right” teacher is favored 
before employing the teacher with the best curriculum (Respondent D 2015). 
Furthermore, to ensure that quality is preserved the organization needs to be 
responsive to and meet the demands from the customers, therefore student well-
being and satisfaction are measured trough different surveys and through open 
questions to and a dialogue with the parents their satisfaction and opinions are 
measured and collected. Thus, the respondent emphasizes participation from 
stakeholders, but also to actively work against discrimination and to measure 
grades to be able to identify student strengths and weaknesses (Respondent D 
2015). 
Similarly to the public and the non-profit organizations the autonomous for-
profit organization view results quality according to the public strategy by 
pursuing general knowledge before high grades. I argue that the reason for that is 
the organization’s niche which emphasizes on other values than achieving high 
grades, but also that influential stakeholders or the parents have selected to put 
their children in the schools based on the niche that the organization have. To be 
able to keep a good reputation the school needs to meet the demands from the 
customers, which thus can be described as stakeholders characterized by density. 
The fact that the school market itself with their niche may be the reason that it 
does not pursue either the public or the private strategy regarding the process or 
structure quality and instead focus on both private and public process quality 
strategies and employing “the right person” instead of several or authorized 
teachers. 
5.1.4 For-profit franchise schools 
The presumption of the organizations belonging to the for-profit franchises was 
that this category would be most similar to the private organization type, where a 
board represented by a CEO constitutes the education provider.  
When trying to identify the veto player in the for-profit franchise respondent 
B, the education provider, states that as the education provider is a limited 
company it is subordinate to the regulations stated in the ABL and as the 
education provider is a legal person it is represented by the CEO. The CEO has 
the overarching responsibility for the organization’s mission and decides what 
responsibility and authority that should be delegated. Further he describes his 
responsibilities as everything except the pedagogical mission which is the 
principal’s responsibility, for example staff, facilities and resource allocation. The 
principal on the other hand has the responsibility to manage the relations with 
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students, parents and teachers but also on a daily basis inform the CEO of the 
school’s activities (Respondent B 2015). 
Respondent G, the principal, confirms the division of responsibilities between 
the principal and the education provider by claiming that the overarching 
responsibilities for the principal are to be the pedagogic leader, manage the 
organization’s activities and make sure that the activities within the school 
achieve the organization’s objectives. He continues by enumerate responsibilities 
for staff, student health, administration and delegating some of the operational 
decisions. Furthermore, respondent G states that the principal is accountable to the 
education provider and describes the division of responsibilities between the 
principal and education provider as that the principal can make decisions 
regarding the organization’s activities but must discuss other types of decisions 
with the education provider. Moreover, that the education provider, which in this 
case is the board which consist of the largest owners, has the general 
responsibility for the organization (Respondent G 2015). 
He continues by stating that when deciding organizational goals it is done in 
cooperation with the board and with the input of the principals but that it is the 
education provider’s responsibility to translate governmental benchmarks to 
organizational goals (Respondent B 2015). Similarly to the education provider 
(respondent B) the principal (respondent G) describes a situation where 
organizational goals are formulated in cooperation between the education 
provider, the principal, teachers and students. He continues by stating that it is 
also important that the students feel included in the process. However, that the 
education provider who are the owners in this case started the school based on a 
specific model for learning which the principal and teachers are required to follow 
but can customize for each student (Respondent G). 
Thus, it seems according to the interviews that the difference between the 
responsibilities of the education provider and the principal is that the principal is 
responsible for the process within the school and the education provider has the 
overarching responsibility for the school and its activities. This supports the 
hieratical division of decision-making that was discussed in the theoretical 
background, where the principal make decisions regarding the implementation or 
execution of the organization’s goals and where the education provider, in this 
case the CEO or the board of directors, makes the strategic decisions. Thus, in 
accordance to the hieratical decision-making structure the CEO or board are 
suggested to be the veto player in a for-profit franchise. However, how much 
responsibility that is delegated to the principal seems to differ between 
organizations. 
As for stakeholder influence the CEO is primarily accountable to the board of 
directors according to respondent B. When questioning respondent G about 
stakeholder influence he support the answer from respondent B that the 
organization first is accountable to the parents who have decided to send their 
children to the school.  
When defining quality respondent B argues that it is crucial to “do the right 
things and to do things right”, which should guide the process and all daily 
activities within the organization in order to achieve a good product in terms of 
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student results. He continues by confirming that good student results are 
fundamental for the existence of the organization because good student results 
give the school a good reputation which secures the influx of new students 
(Respondent B 2015).  
Respondent G also defines quality as the school’s ability to motivate students 
and giving them the best possibilities to achieve the national goals so they are able 
to continue studying. By national goals the respondent refers to grades. To be able 
to get students to achieve high grades the school continuously measures goal 
attainment of the national goals and if a student does not achieve the national 
goals actions are taken by customizing or individualizing education, but the 
school also uses student surveys which measures their well-being. Furthermore, 
quality also depends on the teachers’ motivation and ability to meet the 
requirements of the students (Respondent G 2015). 
The strategy for reaching the organizational quality concept is focused on 
grades where respondent B explains that their school focuses on that the students 
enrolled in the school should be able to achieve the best possible educational 
outcomes and be equipped with certain skills, especially in the 9
th
 grade, that 
enable them to continue to high school and university (Respondent B 2015). 
Furthermore, the indicators that are being used to measure the organization’s 
pedagogical process are especially the grades that students achieve in year 6 to 9. 
This suggests that the organization also is accountable to the parents or customers 
and that a good reputation is an organizational constraint for for-profit franchises 
and therefore would affect the strategies that are being used. 
When defining the organizations goals respondent G states that the 
organization on one hand is obligated to follow and implement the national goals 
and thus is accountable to the controlling government agencies. On the other hand 
as the school is niched and therefore targets focusing on the school’s approach 
also guide the activities within the organization (Respondent G 2015). Likewise, 
respondent B argues that the organization also is obligated to and uses other 
indicators to measure quality within the organization according to the benchmarks 
that are decided by government agencies. However, he continues that to meet the 
demands and expectations from the parents that have chosen to put their children 
in the school are more important than the obligations from the government 
agencies (Respondent B 2015).  
Based on the answers from the respondents the veto player has been identified 
as the CEO or board similar to the private organizational type. The stakeholders 
that can influence the veto player’s decision can be argued to be parents in their 
role as customers or stockholders, in terms of owners, which influence the 
organizational goal of profit maximization according to the ABL (Friedman 1970, 
SFS 2005:551). Since both stakeholder groups can use their size as leverage their 
ability to influence is best described through the concept of density. Furthermore, 
in school B the stakeholder that can be best described as having a central 
possibility to influence the veto player is the board which appoints the veto player, 
the CEO. In school G the largest owners constitutes the board, which is the veto 
player, while the owners also decides who will be part of the board. Regarding the 
organizational goals both schools strategies correspond to the private strategy, 
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where the constraint for the schools is their reputation. To satisfy customers and 
attract new students the schools use their niche, grades and a focus on student 
well-being as marketing strategy. However, regarding the structure quality the 
schools are not pursuing either the public or private strategy but respondent G 
instead emphasizes that having “motivated” teachers have an impact on the 
school’s quality. 
5.2 The comparative perspective 
In this section I include a comparison of the public and private organizational 
categories based on the answers from the respondents. In the following I discuss 
the respondents’ answers according to the hypothesis.  
5.2.1 Differences between public and private organizations according 
to the respondents 
One of the questions in the interview guide and that was asked to each respondent 
was if they could describe what they though was the main differences between 
public and private organizations. The most frequent answers were that the 
respondents emphasized the public organizations’ multifunctional goals, their 
hierarchical management structure and their constraint as being all-inclusive. 
 Respondent D argues that one of the challenges that a principal in a public 
school is facing is to balance all political ambitions which creates a multitude of 
visions and goals for the schools’ activities (Respondent D 2015). Furthermore, 
respondent A defined the school as an arena where different public interest meets 
and a tool for realizing political ambitions (Respondent A 2015). This supports 
the theory of public organizations as multifunctional. 
Regarding management structure, respondent D argues that the most 
significant difference between public and independent schools concerns the 
management structure where organizational outsiders or politicians constitute the 
education provider in the public schools. In the private organization the education 
provider instead consists of both the CEO and the board of directors and includes 
both insiders and outsiders (Respondent D 2015). Likewise, respondent C 
supports respondent D’s argument and emphasizes that the management structure 
in public schools is more hierarchal resulting in a clearer division of who makes 
what decisions between the education provider and the principal than in 
independent schools (Respondent C 2015). This hierarchical structure is also 
emphasized by respondent E as de main distinction between public and private 
organizations (Respondent E 2015). 
Finally, both respondent A and respondent F argue that the primarily 
difference between public and private organizations is the private schools 
possibility to select students, through different marketing techniques, while the 
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public schools are obligated to accept all students within their catchment area 
(Respondent A 2015, Respondent F 2015). 
5.2.2 Hypothesis: The hybrid organizations will pursue quality 
differently as suggested in the new categories 
Hypothesis 1. Public and independent schools will not pursue quality in the same 
manner. However, as the independent schools are a heterogeneous group these 
organizations will also not understand and pursue quality in the same manner due 
to stakeholder influence. But these organizations will more likely understand and 
pursue quality according to the newly introduced categories within the 
independent school group. There will be a difference of which organizations that 
will prioritize public strategies over private strategies, where for-profit franchises 
most likely will pursue quality similar to the private strategy, followed by 
autonomous for-profit schools and non-profit schools which will pursue quality 
most similar to the public strategy. 
 
According to the respondents’ answers I have found that the hypothesis holds. 
As was presumed organizations belonging to a for-profit franchise pursues quality 
most similar to the private strategy. The private strategy was used in four of five 
cases whilst the fifth quality approach, regarding structure quality, does not 
comply with either the public or private strategy. Furthermore, the autonomous 
for-profit organization demonstrated similarities with the private strategy in three 
of five situations, pursued quality similar to both public and private strategies in 
one case and in one case used a public strategy to pursue results quality. Finally 
the non-profit organization pursued quality most similar to the public strategy of 
all hybrids, which was in three out of five cases, however the organization 
pursued quality according to private strategies in two of five cases (see table 6.1 
in next section). 
5.3 Summary of empirical findings 
Table 6.1 below gives an overview of how the strategies that the hybrids are using 
according to the answers of the respondents. 
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The findings from the interviews suggest that all hybrids have the same 
organizational constraints in terms of reputation where customer or stakeholder 
accountability causes organizations to use different marketing strategies to attract 
students which influence veto players’ decisions regarding the pursuit of quality. 
What type of school marketing strategy that is used varies between schools 
where the results show that both for-profit organizational categories market 
themselves by using grades and niches while the non-profit organization focused 
on individualizing education by having small class sizes and few students per 
teacher.  
The public schools on the other hand are not exposed to the same constraints 
as the independent schools and therefore are not forced to pursue a special niche 
or grades. Why they are not focusing on grades as measure for results quality is 
suggested to depend on the public schools’ constraint that they have the general 
education responsibility and therefore cannot refuse any student. 
Further findings from the interviews also suggest that organizational size 
seems to matter for who the veto player is and who the most influential 
stakeholders are. The greatest variety appears to be within the for-profit franchise 
group where small franchises have similarities with the organizations within the 
autonomous for-profit category where the owners together form the education 
provider (and not appointing a CEO) (Respondent G 2015). But also that 
increased size reinforces hierarchical decision-making structures among all 
organization types (ex. Respondent E 2015). 
Furthermore, respondent G and respondent D argue that personal interest, 
which was excluded in the theoretical section, seems to affect what organizational 
quality goals and strategies that are pursued and consequently reduces the 
significance of the ownership structure of the school. Even though the 
organizational goals of an limited company is determined by the ABL which 
generally equals profit maximization, it also includes the possibility for the 
organizations to have other objectives (Dir. 2015:22, Fi 2012:11, SOU 2015:7), 
which seems to be determined by personal interest. 
In summary, the empirical findings suggest that both the veto player and the 
constraints in terms of stakeholder accountability matters for how organizations 
understand and pursue quality in educational provision. 
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6 Conclusions and further research 
The purpose of this study was to attempt to explain how to understand the 
differences in quality output of the organizations in the Swedish school system by 
focusing on the influence of stakeholders on organizational decision-making.  
The background to the research problem was the radical transformations to the 
Swedish educational system that were initiated in the end of the 1980s and the 
early 1990s which changed the supply of education, the responsibilities for the 
organization of education and the regulation of the school market. New actors, 
labeled independent schools, entered the school market and were allowed to 
compete against the traditional public schools. Decisions regarding educational 
quality were delegated to local actors which translated national goals and 
benchmarks into organizational objectives. The assumption was that the reforms 
would increase the aggregated educational quality. However, the implementation 
of the reforms did not enhance the overall quality level, furthermore scholars have 
found that the between school variation has increased which seems to be 
associated with the characteristics of these new actors, the independent schools 
(see for example Sahlgren 2011, p. 31–32). One of the divergences of these 
organizations concerns their stakeholders. The emphasis of this study was 
therefore on organizational differences in terms of stakeholders with the 
presumption that different stakeholders can influence different decisions which 
generate different organizational outcomes. 
To answer the research question of how stakeholders influence how the 
organizations on the Swedish school market understand and pursue quality in 
educational provision an analytical framework was elaborated based on 
organizational, management and stakeholder theories where differences between 
public and private organizations were established. The framework suggested that 
the differences in quality output between public and private organizations could 
be explained by identifying the decision-maker or veto player within the 
organization but also by analyzing stakeholder accountability where influential 
stakeholders’ positions to the veto player affected the degree of their possibility to 
influence decisions. Furthermore, external factors that influenced decisions were 
examined through the concept of constraints which affect the organizations’ 
strategies. Additionally, the concept of quality was operationalized into four 
different approaches; results quality, process quality, structure quality and brand. 
The independent schools or the hybrid organizations were divided into three 
groups dependent on their ownership structure separating public schools from 
non-profit organizations, autonomous for-profit organizations and for-profit 
franchises. Based on stakeholder characteristics of these hybrids a hypothesis was 
presented which suggested that the hybrids would pursue quality differently 
through various combinations of the public and private strategies. But also that the 
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for-profit franchise category would be most similar to the private strategy 
followed by the autonomous for-profit category and the non-profit organizations 
which would be most similar to the public strategy. 
From the empirical findings I have found that the hypothesis can be supported 
and that quality is pursued accordingly to each school’s category, where for-profit 
franchises used private strategies in four of five of the mentioned quality 
approaches, while autonomous for-profit organizations used private strategies in 
three of five cases while the non-profit organizations instead used public 
strategies to pursue quality in three of five cases. What strategy that is used seems 
to be associated with the organizations’ constraints in terms of stakeholder 
influence on decision-making, who the veto player is and what personal interests 
he has. Regarding the veto players the results show a mixed story where the veto 
player and whether the veto player is an insider or outsider stakeholder, seems to 
be associated with the organizational size, primarily in the for-profit franchise 
category. 
The theoretical aim of this study was to do a plausibility probe and explore 
whether further studies of the issue is needed. The study confirmed the hypothesis 
however further studies within each category is needed to investigate the 
variations within each organizational category and to be able to better generalize 
and draw conclusions from the groups. The results of this study have also 
indicated that organizational size and personal interest of the decision-maker 
affect organizations’ quality pursuit. However, how, in what organizations and 
why remain unanswered questions and represents a point of departure in a 
different study. 
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Appendix 1 
Schools in Malmö 
Apelgårdsskolan 
Augustenborgsskolan 
Backaskolan 
Bergaskolan 
Bladins grundskola 
Boukefs Privatskola 
Bäckagårdsskolan 
Dammfriskolan 
Europaportens grundskola 
Gottorpskolan 
Hermodsdalsskolan 
Humfryskolan 
Höjaskolan 
Johannesskolan 
Kastanjeskolan 
Kilowattskolan i Malmö 
Kirsebergsskolan 
Kroksbäcksskolan 
Kryddgårdsskolan 
Lindeborgsskolan 
Lindängeskolan 
Linnéskolan 
Malmö Idrottsgrundskola 
Malmö International School 
Malmö Montessoriskola 
Mariaskolan 
Montessorigrundskolan Maria 
Munkhätteskolan 
Möllevångsskolan 
Oxievångsskolan 
Pilbäcksskolan 
Runstyckets skola 
Rönnenskolan 
Rörsjöskolan-Zenith 
Slottstadens skola 
Sofielundsskolan 
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Sorgenfriskolan 
Stenkulaskolan 
Strandskolan 
Sveaskolan 
Söderkullaskolan 
Videdals privatskolor 
Videdalsskolan 
Vittra Västra Hamnen 
Värner Rydénskolan 
Västra Hamnens skolan 
Ängsdals skola 
Östra Skolan 
Source: Malmö Stad, Utbildningsinfo. 
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Schools sorted after ownership structure 
 
Table A.1: Number of schools in Malmö that provide 9
th
 grade education 
School type Education provider No. in Malmö 
Public Municipal 32 
Independent  16 
 Limited/ joint-stock company 10 
 Trust/Foundation 1 
 Non-profit organization (secular) 4 
 Economic association 0 
 Trading partnership 0 
 Limited partnership 0 
 Religious (non-profit) organization 1 
 Sole trader 0 
Source: Malmö Stad, Skolverket 1, Utbildningsinfo. 
 
 
Table A.2: Number of schools in Malmö that provide 9
th
 grade education, divided 
by ownership structure 
Education 
provider 
Organization group, by 
ownership structure 
No. in Malmö 
Municipality Public organization 32 
Non-profit org. Non-profit organization 6 
Limited company   
 For-profit franchise 3 
 Autonomous for-profit school 7 
Source: Malmö Stad, Utbildningsinfo. 
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Appendix 2 
List of respondents 
Respondent A Education provider, Public school, Interview, Malmö,  
April 24
th
 2015. 
Respondent B Education provider, For-profit franchise, Telephone  
interview, May 21
st
 2015. 
Respondent C Principal, Public school, Interview, Malmö, May 25
th
 2015. 
Respondent D Education provider/Principal, Autonomous for-profit  
organization, Interview, Malmö, May 27
th
 2015. 
Respondent E Principal, Non-profit school, Interview, Malmö,  
May 29
th
 2015. 
Respondent F Education provider, Non-profit school, Interview, Malmö, 
  May 29
th
 2015. 
Respondent G Principal, For-profit franchise, Interview, Malmö,  
June 24
th
 2015 
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Interview guide 
The interviews were structure into four overarching themes and were conducted in 
Swedish. I will therefore include both the translated version of the interview 
questions followed by the original Swedish. 
English version (translated) 
1. The principal and the organization 
a. Describe your role as a principal 
- What duties do you have? 
- And responsibilities? 
b. What goals guide the work within your organization/school? 
- Who set these goals? 
c. In your role as principal, to whom are you accountable to? 
2. The education provider and the organization 
a. Describe the education provider 
- Who constitutes the education provider? 
- What is the education provider’s role? 
- Duties? 
- Responsibilities? 
b. To whom is the education provider responsible to? 
3. The relation between the principal – education provider  
a. How would you describe the division of responsibilities between the principal and 
the education provider?  
- Ex. Give an example. 
b. What decisions can the principal influence+take and what decisions are decided by 
the education provider? 
c. Has a conflict ever emerged between the principal and the education provider? 
- Ex. Give an example. 
d. How do you think that the role as principal/education provider differs between a 
private and public organization? 
4. Education quality as organizational goal 
a. What does the concept of quality mean for you?  
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- What indicators do you use to measure quality in your organization? 
- Who decides what indicators that are used? 
b. How do you work to promote quality within your organization? 
- Ex. Give an example. 
c. What is your responsibility as principal/education provider that the organization 
promotes educational quality? 
d. What do you think are the reasons that quality differs between different schools? 
5. Other 
a. Is there anything else that you would like to include that you think that we haven’t 
addressed?  
Swedish version (original) 
1. Rektorn och verksamheten 
d. Beskriv din roll som rektor  
- Vad är dina arbetsuppgifter? 
- Och ansvarsområden? 
e. Vad arbetar ni efter för mål i er organisation/skola? 
- Vem sätter målen? 
f. Vilka är du ansvarig mot/för i rollen som rektor? 
2. Huvudmannen och verksamheten 
c. Beskriv huvudmannen 
- Vilka utgör huvudmannen? 
- Vilken är huvudmannens roll? 
- Arbetsuppgifter? 
- Ansvarsområden? 
d. Vilka är du ansvarig mot i rollen som huvudman? 
3. Relationen rektor – huvudman  
e. Hur skulle du beskriva ansvarsfördelningen mellan rektor och huvudmannen?  
- Ex. Ge ett exempel på detta. 
f. Vilka beslut kan rektorn fatta/påverka och vilka fattar huvudmannen? 
g. Har det någon gång uppstått en konflikt mellan rollen som rektor och rollen som 
huvudman? 
- Ex. Ge exempel. 
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h. Hur tror du rollen som rektor/huvudman skiljer sig mellan en verksamhet med 
kommunal huvudman och en verksdamhet med en enskild huvudman? 
4. Utbildningskvalitet som verksamhetsmål 
e. Vad innebär begreppet kvalitet för er?  
- Vilka indikatorer använder ni er av, för att mäta kvalitet, i er verksamhet? 
- Vem bestämmer vilka indikatorer som ska användas? 
f. Hur arbetar ni för att främja kvaliteten i er skola? 
- Ex. Ge exempel på detta. 
g. Vad är ditt ansvar som rektor/huvudman att utbildningen är av god kvalitet? 
h. Vad tror du är orsaken till att kvaliteten skiljer sig åt mellan olika skolor? 
5. Övrigt 
b. Är det något annat du vill tillägga som du känner du att jag glömt ta upp? 
